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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Modernization and Cultural Democratization in East Asia 
 
By 
 
Hannah June Kim 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
 
 University of California, Irvine, 2019 
 
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein, Chair 
 
 
This dissertation examines how much progress the middle class in East Asia has made in 
transforming into citizens of democratic states. The following research questions are addressed: 
Are middle-class citizens in East Asia committed to democracy? Are they willing to become the 
vanguard of the democratization process in the region? Do they prefer liberal democracy to other 
regime types, as middle-class citizens in the West are believed to? I contend that the classic 
relationship between modernization and democratization may not be applicable to the East-Asian 
context. I argue that this is because of a particular history of state-led development in East Asia, 
which limited growth in liberal democratic political culture and altered the commitment of the 
middle class to liberal democracy. I demonstrate these differences through the notion of 
democratic citizenship, which observes the cognitive, affective, and behavioral patterns of 
democratic commitment. Using data from the World Values Survey and Asia Barometer Survey, 
I reveal consistent differences in how middle-class respondents in the East view democracy. 
Moreover, I find that middle-class respondents with higher state dependency are less likely to 
view democracy in the liberal terms favored in the West. These results contribute to broader 
debates about modernization and political culture worldwide.
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
East Asia is one of the world’s largest and most dynamic regions. Both full-fledged 
dictatorships and consolidated democracies reside in the region, with some areas being 
completely poverty-stricken and others rich (Inoguchi and Carlson 2006). Relative to other parts 
of the world, however, East Asia remains democratically underdeveloped. Only three of the 
region’s numerous countries are full-fledged democracies, and these few democracies may be in 
distress due to the region’s resistance to democratization (Chu, Diamond, Nathan, and Shin 2009; 
Shin 2012).  
The democratic system in East Asia is relatively new. Japan was the first to democratize 
in 1945, with South Korea and Taiwan following in the 1980s. Although six democracies exist in 
the region, only the abovementioned three are fully consolidated.1 Other democracies, such as 
the Philippines, Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar, are regressing and failing to function as 
liberal democracies because of limited press freedom, the growth of military rule, and transitions 
back to one-party systems. Indeed, authoritarianism continues to be a strong competitor to 
democracy, and a large proportion of citizens in East Asia continue to support autocratic systems 
(Chu et al. 2009). With little commitment to democracy and democratic values, a high chance 
exists that a consolidating democracy will weaken and deconsolidate into a nondemocratic one.  
Despite its limited democratization process, East Asia’s socioeconomic growth has been 
exponential. Many countries experienced “The East Asian Miracle” by achieving high rates of 
economic growth within just a few decades. This combination of economic development and 
democratic underdevelopment contradicts the central claim of modernization theory, which 
contends that “the more well-to-do a nation, the more likely the chances it will sustain 
                                               
1 The six include one second-wave democracy, Japan, and five third-wave democracies: Indonesia, Mongolia, South 
Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan (Shin 2012).  
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democracy” (Lipset 1959). According to the theory, democracy will follow socioeconomic 
development through a shift in bargaining power from the elites in the upper class to the middle 
class, creating a newly empowered group that pushes for democratic reforms (Lipset 1959; 
Przeworski 1999; Moore 1966; Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2005).  
The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between modernization and 
cultural democratization in East Asia. Essentially, it examines how much progress the middle 
class has made in transforming into citizens of democratic states. The following research 
questions drive this study: Are middle-class citizens in East Asia committed to democracy? Are 
they willing to become the vanguard of the democratization process in the region? Do they prefer 
democracy to other regime types, as middle-class citizens are believed to in the West? Do 
democratic orientations among the middle classes vary between those living under one-party 
dictatorships, one-party authoritarian regimes, and democracies?  
In this dissertation, I contend that the classic relationship between modernization and 
democratization is not applicable to countries in East Asia because of differing perceptions of 
democracy among the middle classes. I argue that middle-class groups in the region are unlikely 
to be committed to the liberal democratic system because of different understandings of 
democracy, and as such, they are less likely to support it in its classic form. I theorize that this is 
because of the state-dependent economic model in East Asia, under which state-led economic 
development has altered the commitment of the middle classes to liberal democracy. I 
demonstrate these differences throughout this dissertation by comparing levels and patterns of 
middle-class orientation toward democracy across the region as well as cross-regionally through 
the notion of democratic citizenship.  
3 
 
Relevant research on modernization theory, the middle class, and cultural 
democratization in East Asia is limited in breadth and depth. Theoretically, previous studies have 
not examined how state-led economic modernization could influence the middle class’ views on 
democracy in East Asia. Empirically, little systematic effort has been made to determine whether 
the middle classes in East Asia are committed to democracy, although some have looked at 
characteristics of the middle class in specific countries or areas (see Koo 1999; Hattori Funatsu 
2003; Nathan 2016; Chen and Lu 2011; Chen 2013; Anderson 2011). Conceptually, many 
empirical studies have focused on a standard definition of liberal democracy and have not 
explored the idea that democracy can hold various meanings.2 This dissertation attempts to 
overcome limitations in the literature by suggesting new methods of studying the commitment of 
the middle class to democracy in East Asia.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. First, I provide a discussion of the 
determinants of democracy discussed in the literature. Second, I discuss the role and importance 
of the middle class in the democratization process. Third, I describe how differences in economic 
development influence feelings of dependency towards the government and how that could alter 
their democratic orientations. Fourth, I introduce important concepts used in this study, including 
the notion of democratic citizenship, the group that encompasses the middle class, and the 
selection of countries used to describe the East and the West. Fifth I explain the data and 
methodology used in this dissertation. Finally, I conclude with brief chapter outlines.  
 
Determinants of Democracy 
                                               
2 Some scholars have utilized other conceptions of democracy (Lu and Shi 2015; Chang, Chu, and Huang 2011; 
Shin 2012) but have not applied it to modernization theory and the middle classes in East Asia. 
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 What explains the emergence of democracy? What motivates citizens to support 
democracy over other regime types? Numerous debates have been held on the various 
determinants that lead to democratization and democratic consolidation, many of which have 
focused primarily on how and why people do or do not support democracy. Of them, several 
complementary theoretical perspectives exist, including democratic political learning theory, 
which attributes increasing democratic support to longer and positive experiences with 
democratic institutions (Mattes and Bratton 2007; Rose, Mischler, and Haerpfer 1998; Converse 
1969; Dahl 1989; Fuchs 1999; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995) because repeated 
involvement with a political process over time familiarizes people with the system in which they 
live (McClosky and Zaller 1984).3 Regime performance theory similarly emphasizes how well 
democratic regimes perform and how citizens assess the democracies under which they live 
(Evans and Whitefield 1995; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999; Rose et al. 1998; Shin and 
McDonough 1999).4 In the same vein, social capital theory posits that a vibrant and robust civil 
society that fosters growth in association activism as well as the norms of reciprocity and 
interpersonal trust leads to viable support for democracy (Diamond 1999; Norris 2002; Putnam 
1993),5 whereas socialization theory recognizes how different life experiences—particularly 
during childhood—can be a powerful force in shaping political attitudes.6  
Other variants include distributional consequences of economic development. The 
redistributivist theories of regime change suggest that economic inequality can have highly 
different political consequences for democracy’s prospects. Democratization is more likely either 
                                               
3 This is also called the political learning and resocialization model.  
4 Katz and Levin (2015) demonstrated how poor government responses reduce support for democracy.  
5 See Chambers and Kopstein (2006) for an in-depth discussion on civil society and the state, and Chambers and 
Kopstein (2001) for a discussion on how civil society can negatively impact support for liberal democracy. 
6 Similar research shows how political communication and predispositions early on in the life cycle can change 
citizens’ underlying opinions (Tesler 2015).  
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when inequality is low (Boix 2003) or at middling levels (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; 2006). 
Moreover, the elite competition approach focuses on the relationship between economic growth, 
inequality, and regime change, and suggests that inequality fosters democratization because 
incentives for democracy increase among the elite (Ansell and Samuels 2014).  
Modernization and Democratization 
Many of the theories on the determinants of democracy have implicitly or explicitly 
adopted the fundamental tenets of modernization theory. In its most general form, this theory 
contends that socioeconomic development is a necessary condition, or sine quo non, of liberal 
democratization (Lipset 1959; Moore 1966; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, 2000). As 
countries become wealthier, they are more likely to democratize. Although scholars have debated 
the proposition, igniting decades of intense debate on the conditions most conducive to 
democratization, most political scientists consider the theory one of the most robust findings in 
the field and continue to use it to explain democratic regime transitions.  
Among the numerous driving forces, modernization theory emphasizes the crucial role of 
the middle class in the creation and sustenance of democracy. The middle class is a vital element 
in the democratization process because it is crucial in the struggle for power, because economic 
interests drive those in the upper class to prefer nondemocratic systems and those in the lower 
class to prefer democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). That is, the middle class plays a 
critical role when the working class attempts to seize power for redistribution and the upper class 
attempts to keep it, and thus, the political stance and demands of middle-class people can be 
considered critical in the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule (Koo 1991).  
The prominent role of the middle class has attracted debates on their democratic 
orientations, which have been grouped into unilinear and contingent approaches (Chen 2013). 
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The unilinear approach supports the idea that a growing middle class works as the “main thrust 
of the democratization movement” (Hattori, Funatsu and Torii 2003: 129-130). The contingent 
approach, by contrast, assumes that the relationship between economic development and 
democratization is dynamic and that democratic orientations are contingent upon salient 
sociopolitical and socioeconomic conditions (Chen 2013: 5). That is, the middle class will shift 
its democratic orientation depending on its association with an authoritarian state, social and 
material satisfaction, class fragmentation, and worry over political instability. Following the 
contingent approach, I argue that East Asia seems to defy the general thrust of modernization 
because of its history of state-dependent modernization, which has increased middle-class 
people’s feelings of dependency on the state, thereby altering their democratic orientations.  
 
From the Perspective of the Middle Class 
Differences in Economic Modernization 
Over the past few decades, East Asia has experienced rapid economic growth, which has 
closed the economic gap between the East and West; furthermore, the region has seen an average 
annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of almost 8% (Welzel and Dalton 2017:1). 
Both the democracies and nondemocracies were resource-poor economies that started from low 
per capita income, but soon experienced high rates of economic growth. For example, between 
1965 and 1990, Japan’s GDP per capita grew from 9,828 to 26,930, Korea from 970 to 6,330, 
Taiwan from 995 to 8,800, and Singapore from 2,312 to 14,210 (Krueger 1995:11).7 The 
impressive performance of economies in the region was called “The East Asian Miracle” by the 
World Bank because of its persistent high growth rates, which grew faster than any emerging 
market in the world through the promotion of investment, opening up to export manufacturing, 
                                               
7 This is based on US$ during the 1990s. 
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and strong government interventions. More impressive is that countries such as South Korea, 
China, Taiwan, and Singapore achieved such high rates of economic growth within four decades 
when advanced economies of Western Europe took centuries to achieve the same (Quibria 2002).  
State-led economic development, also called developmental or crony capitalism, played a 
crucial role in the region’s rapid economic growth. East-Asian governments provided an 
infrastructure that took control of the economy by intervening, regulating, and planning growth 
through means such as facilitating exports by adopting export-oriented trade policies; 
furthermore, the governments shifted the labor force from agricultural to industrial employment 
(Krueger 1995:23), leading to the creation and growth of a middle class. Indeed, states 
participated in the development of the middle class from the very beginning. In South Korea, for 
example, the state built government institutions to help capitalist classes grow (Chibber 2005). 
Similarly in Taiwan, the government implemented a series of policies to create and nurture local 
private entrepreneurs who eventually comprised the middle class in a place where such a class 
had been nearly nonexistent (Evans et al. 1985:253). The middle class thus developed a 
dependency on the government for its survival and prosperity (Bellin 2000, 2002; Brown and 
Jones 1995; Englehart 2003; Johnson 1985; Jones 1998). The dependency that developed among 
the middle class toward the state eventually changed their actions and behaviors, creating stark 
contrasts between middle classes in the East and West.  
Differences between the Middle Classes in the East and West 
In the West, the middle class participated as prominent actors in the democratization 
process. They learned to defy the state and push for property rights as well as redistribution. In 
the East, however, the middle class played an insignificant role in the development process 
because of the strong role of the state in socioeconomic development. States in East Asia 
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prioritized economic development over political and social development, and economic growth 
nurtured middle-class citizens into deferring to the state because it provided a better standard of 
living and improved employment opportunities.  
In addition, the length of economic growth and modernization influenced the behavior of 
middle-class groups and their orientations toward democracy. In the West, modernization 
proceeded through two stages, one during the seventeenth century and the other during the 
twentieth (Huntington 1966). Because modernization spanned centuries, democracy became a 
large part of Western society, whereas in the East, countries’ modernization occurred within the 
span of a few decades, providing democracy little time to establish itself as a fixed regime and 
making the overthrow of democratic regimes more likely. Ultimately, middle-class citizens in the 
East had very little time to not only accept but also comprehend and support what constitutes a 
democracy—and therefore have less attachment to it as a regime system. Middle-class citizens in 
the East Asian nondemocracies, moreover, had even less opportunity to comprehend and accept 
democracy due to limited contact and lack of experience and familiarity with the liberal 
democratic system.  
Feelings of Government Dependency 
This combination of state-dependent economic modernization and limited democratic 
experience increased the middle classes’ dependency on having a strong state and decreased their 
commitment to liberal democracy. Governments in East Asia developed business structures that 
provided incentives to support strong states with active, interventionist policies; this contradicts 
the liberal democratic system, which often supports laissez-faire leadership.8 As such, the middle 
classes’ orientations and dependency that developed toward the government influenced their 
commitment to democracy through limiting their commitment to liberal democracy and altering 
                                               
8 See Lewin, Lippitt and White (1939) for details on the three styles of leadership and decision-making tendencies. 
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their democratic orientations. Although middle class groups in East Asia today may be less likely 
to actually depend on the government, feelings of government dependency still remain.  
Implications 
These differences in economic modernization, the development of middle-class 
characteristics, and growing development of government dependency have four implications. 
First, state-dependent modernization in the East and West can lead to different trajectories in 
socioeconomic growth in the two regions, and even within different countries in East Asia, 
leading to systematic differences in how the middle class view democracy. Second, state-
dependent modernization can alter the processes of cultural democratization and lead to different 
democratic political orientations among middle-class groups. Third, these differences can be 
observed through a multidimensional definition of democratic citizenship, which demonstrates 
how conceptions of, support for, and behaviors toward democracy vary among the middle class. 
Finally, these differences among the middle class can imply that democracy is not a one-size-
fits-all phenomenon but one that varies in type, implying that the classic causality between 
modernization and democratization may not be universally applicable to different cultural 
contexts.  
 
Important Concepts  
Democratic Citizenship 
Democratic commitment can be measured in various ways.9 To thoroughly investigate 
differences among middle-class groups, I examine how committed such groups are to the liberal 
                                               
9 See Nie et al. (1996); Bratton (2013); Almond and Verba (1963); Fox (1994); Bratton and Van de Walle (1996); 
Dalton (2008); and Shin et al. (2005) for various types of democratic measures. Nie et al. (1996) measured 
democratic orientations through two dimensions: democratic enlightenment, which includes behaviors and 
cognitions that lead to political self-interest, and political engagement, which includes qualities that change norms 
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notion of democracy through the concept of democratic citizenship. Democratic citizenship is a 
multidimensional concept used to observe whether individuals will embrace liberal democracy as 
“the only game in town” (Przeworski 1991). It has been measured in various ways, yet most 
relevant literature on analyzing democratic commitment have conceptual, theoretical, and 
methodological limitations. Many scholars have focused on regime or structural orientations and 
have failed to consider process and cognitive orientations. Thus, democratic citizenship is 
narrowly or thinly viewed as a unidimensional phenomenon and narrowly focused concept (see 
Tilly 1996). It often requires the identification of some democratic properties but does not 
differentiate those properties from its alternatives (Sartori 1987; McClosky and Brill 1983; 
McClosky and Zaller 1984; Schmitter and Karl 1991). For example, when people are asked to 
define democracy, the properties named vary and sometimes include authoritarian traits 
(Canache 2012; Chu et al 2008; Welzel 2013). Moreover, it rests on the assumption that people 
understand what a democracy entails and that this understanding is the same across cultures and 
regions. In reality, however, democracy is a highly contested concept that has various meanings 
to different people, varying in quality and quantity as well as cross-nationally and longitudinally 
(Ariely 2015; Ariely and Davidov 2011; de Regt 2013; Moncagatta 2015; Shin and Kim 2017).  
The present study treats democratic citizenship meaningfully as a phenomenon that 
measures differences in popular conceptions of democracy with three dimensions: the cognitive, 
the affective, and the behavioral. The cognitive dimension focuses on understandings, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
along with democratic understanding and adherence. Other scholars have used the civic culture approach by 
defining it as “participation in popular collective action and engagement with political leaders and institutions, 
including elections and within a rule of law,” which stems from “a political understanding of citizenship based on 
civic engagement and participation” (Bratton 2013); using the framework of disengaged parochials and passive 
subjects (Almond and Verba 1963); or measuring it as clients who seek patronage (Fox 1994; Bratton and Van de 
Walle 1996). Engaged democratic citizenship has been defined by citizens who are assertive, independent, and who 
often focus on the welfare of others (Dalton 2008), whereas democratic political sophistication analyzes “patterns of 
political orientations that would promote the process of democratization by expanding electoral democracy and 
removing the residues of authoritarian politics” (Shin et al. 2005).  
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affective dimension emphasizes support, and the behavioral dimension focuses on action. 
Specifically, the cognitive dimension focuses on how people conceptualize democracy, whether 
they can differentiate between democratic and autocratic properties, and which democratic 
properties they consider essential. In essence, it taps into democratic attitudes through different 
domains of democratic knowledge; it asks which democratic properties are considered essential 
as well as which are the most and least prevalent; and whether people view democracy more 
procedurally or substantively, more liberally or illiberally, and more broadly or deeply.  
The affective dimension focuses on whether people support democracy by further 
analyzing whether they favor democracy over other forms of government, specifically autocratic 
ones, as well as whether they prefer democracy as both political ideals and a collective political 
enterprise. It asks whether people support democracy; whether they prefer democracy to 
autocratic rule; and what the indicators of democratic support or democratic decline are.  
The behavioral dimension is equated to defending democracy and refers to whether 
people are willing to fight for democracy through political activity. This dimension is illustrated 
by political behavior and active participation to examine how people drive the democratic 
process to influence the behavior of political institutions, which can lead to certain desired 
outcomes. It asks whether people are willing to defend democracy and democratic rule despite its 
limitations; and whether their political actions will change if democratic institutions do not 
perform satisfactorily.  
Measuring democratic citizenship as a multidimensional phenomenon helps overcome 
many of its limitations as a tool for comparing the contours and sources of democratic 
citizenship across both democratic and authoritarian countries. These core dimensions of 
democratic citizenship are key components to a healthy and effective democracy.  
12 
 
 
Table 1.1 Dimensions of Democratic Citizenship. 
Cognitive Dimension Affective Dimension Behavioral Dimension 
• How do citizens 
conceptualize 
democracy? 
• How informed are they 
about democratic 
properties? 
• What properties do 
they understand most 
and least? 
• Do they understand it 
procedurally or 
substantively, liberally 
or illiberally? 
• How much affinity do 
citizens feel toward 
democracy? 
• Do they feel attached 
to other forms of 
government, such as 
autocracy? 
• Are they likely to 
embrace democracy as 
“the only game in 
town”? 
• How willing are 
citizens to fight for 
democracy? 
• Are they willing to 
defend democratic rule 
in spite of its failures? 
• Will they continue to 
protect democracy 
even if the institution 
does not perform to the 
satisfaction of its 
citizens? 
 
The Middle Class 
 It is particularly difficult to define the middle class. The middle class today is 
significantly different from the bourgeoisie originally described by Barrington Moore (1966), 
since the bourgeoisie entailed urban capitalists who had the ability to act independently while the 
middle class today is broadly defined as those who are not poor or immensely wealthy 
(Cheeseman 2015; van de Walle 2012). The middle class has been identified in various ways in 
the literature, including forms of employment (Goldthorpe 1980), levels of education (Lipset 
1959), amount of wealth (Inglehart 1990), and lived poverty (Cheeseman 2014). The middle 
class has also been defined by the purchasing power parity of households (Banerjee and Duflo 
2008), median per capita income (Birdsall, Graham, and Pettinato 2000) and even food budget, 
share of expenditure used for entertainment, health care, and domestic infrastructure.10 In 
                                               
10 See Banerjee and Duflo (2008) for details on different forms of measurement of the middle class.  
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addition to these objective measures, subjective measures have also been used to identify the 
middle class through self-reported class status.  
Identifying class through income, however, continues to be the most commonly used 
method since income leads to changes in education, employment, and other forms of 
socioeconomic growth (Inglehart 1990; Lipset 1959; Cheeseman 2015). Similarly, this study 
identifies the middle class through reported income. Adopting Easterly’s (2001) measurement of 
the middle class, which is composed of those between the 20th and 80th percentiles of income 
within a group, I use similar percentiles in the listed scales of income. This measurement is most 
commonly used, and it considers both subjective and objective measures. Moreover, it provides a 
simple and standardized way to measure similar groups of people from different countries and 
various regime types.  
The East and The West 
The empirical work that follows systematically compares the democratic citizenship of 
the middle classes in three democracies in the East with that in three democracies in the West 
along with three East-Asian democracies with three East-Asian nondemocracies. Adopting the 
TNT Principle, this study observes cross-national, cross-regional, and within-national variations 
among the selected countries through comparing the democratic orientations of middle classes in 
democracies in the East with those in the West; through comparing those in East-Asian 
democracies to those in nondemocracies; as well as providing one in-depth case study.11 More 
specifically, I compare three consolidated democracies with high levels of socioeconomic growth 
in the East, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (the only full-fledged democracies in the region) 
                                               
11 A comparative methodology often incorporates a research design that is referred to as the “TNT Principle,” which 
compares across time, across nations, and across types of institutions (Grofman 1999a). 
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with the United States, Australia, and New Zealand in the West, which Welzel (2013) described 
as the “New West.”  
Subsequently, I examine six countries in East Asia that are commonly grouped as the 
Confucian Asian countries: China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam.12 
These comparisons highlight differences and similarities among the middle class through various 
typologies and analytical frameworks, to link various groups across the three core characteristics 
of democratic citizenship. Next, I explore whether feelings of government dependency influence 
all three dimensions of democratic citizenship (cognitive, affective, and behavioral) among the 
middle class living in democracies in the East and West as well as among those living in 
democracies and nondemocracies in East Asia.  
 
Databases and Method of Analysis 
To properly test the aforementioned arguments, this study used two datasets to provide 
descriptive and relational results. The World Values Survey (hereinafter the WVS) is a nationally 
representative survey that provides both cross-national and time-series–based data through 
interviews. The WVS consists of questions based on economic development, democratization, 
social capital, and subjective well-being, and focuses on people’s values and beliefs over time. 
Although a total of six waves of the survey currently exist, this study uses the 6th wave (2010–
2014) to provide both comparisons among the middle class by region (East and West) along with 
in-depth cross-regional and within-country analyses of countries in East Asia.13  
                                               
12 See Shin (2012) for details on Confucian Asian countries and Welzel (2011) for different groupings of Western 
democracies.  
13 Wave 1 (1981–1984), Wave 2 (1990–1994), Wave 3 (1995–1998), Wave 4 (1999–2004), Wave 5 (2005–2009), 
and Wave 6 (2010–2014). 
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The Asian Barometer Survey (hereinafter ABS) is a survey database located in Taiwan 
that includes reliable public-opinion data with randomly selected samples of the adult population 
of each country in the region.14 The ABS includes several questions that concern cultural 
democratization. Four rounds of the survey were conducted from 2001 to 2014, and the present 
study attempts to draw data from the last wave (2014–2016) for the six East-Asian countries 
being studied and compare East-Asian democracies with nondemocracies.  
 
Chapter Outline 
This dissertation includes a total of five chapters in addition to the Introduction and 
Conclusion. The five chapters are split into three sections. The first two examine how middle-
class citizens conceptualize democracy; these different conceptions are compared by region and 
regime type. The following two chapters discuss whether middle-class citizens support 
democracy or autocracy as well as compare levels of support by region and regime type. The 
final chapter provides a case study of South Korea and analyzes whether the middle class there 
are willing to defend democracy despite its limitations as a form of government.  
In Chapter 2, I begin my analysis with the conceptualization and understandings of 
democracy. I examine cognitive patterns among the middle class in the East (Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan) and West (the United States, Australia, and New Zealand). I identify which 
democratic properties are the most and least preferred among the middle class in both regions, as 
well as and whether they conceptualize democracy in particular manners. These analyses are 
intended to address four questions: How do the middle class in East Asia identify the essential 
features of democracy? How broad or narrow are their understandings of democracy, and what 
                                               
14 Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia. 
16 
 
properties do they value most and least? Do they conceptualize democracy more procedurally or 
substantially, or more liberally or illiberally? How do all four of these conceptions differ from 
the middle class in consolidated democracies in the West? 
Chapter 3 examines how those living in similar cultural and social environments 
understand democracy, and explores these differences among those in six East-Asian Confucian-
based societies with varying political contexts: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, Singapore, 
and Vietnam. This chapter examines middle-class East Asians more in depth and asks: How 
differently do East Asians understand democracy? Through a similar conceptual framework but 
more detailed analysis to that of Chapter 2, I examine how middle-class East Asians from 
different countries and regime types identify essential democratic properties and which 
properties are most and least prevalent among them.  
Chapter 4 examines the affective dimension of democratic citizenship (i.e., the extent of 
middle-class support for democracy in the East and West). I gauge the extent of the middle class 
democratic support by comparing it with autocratic support, as well as analyze whether this is 
increasing over time. Through this, I explore one of the main propositions of this study; that is, 
whether feelings of government dependency influence democratic support. I attempt to answer 
three central and closely related questions: Do middle-class citizens in East-Asian democracies 
support democracy? Do they prefer democracy to other regime types? What are the indicators of 
democratic decline in East Asia and are they similar to those of the West? 
In Chapter 5, I investigate potential variations in democratic support between two 
subgroups within East Asia: the middle class in East-Asian democracies and nondemocracies. 
Furthermore, I analyze autocratic support to estimate whether democratic support is superficial. I 
attempt to answer three central and closely related questions: Do middle-class East Asians 
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support democracy or autocracy? Does support vary among those in democratic and 
nondemocratic regimes in East Asia? Do feelings of government dependency influence support 
among middle-class people in the region? 
In Chapter 6, I analyze the behavioral dimension of democratic citizenship by observing 
how much middle-class citizens are willing to defend democracy through various forms of 
political participation in South Korea. I examine the actions of middle-class citizens and how 
they influence the behavior of political institutions, which can lead to certain outcomes through 
mass political behavior and participation. I attempt to answer three questions: Are citizens 
willing to defend democracy? Are middle-class citizens willing to defend democratic rule, 
despite its limitations? Will their political actions change if democratic institutions do not 
perform to their satisfaction? 
Finally, in Chapter 7, I highlight all major empirical findings of the study before 
discussing the crucial political implications of these findings for the middle class in East Asia. 
Furthermore, I discuss the theoretical implications for what this means for the future of 
democracy in the region.  
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PART 1: THE COGNITIVE DIMENSION 
 
This section examines how middle-class citizens conceptualize democracy as well as how their 
understandings of democracy vary. Furthermore, it discusses how the relationship between East-
Asian middle-class citizens and their governments developed because of the prominent role of 
states in their historical economic growth. In the following chapter, I depict the role of 
government dependency in how middle-class citizens understand democracy in the East and how 
it varies in the West. Subsequently, I consider how conceptions of democracy vary between 
countries in East Asia.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY AMONG THE MIDDLE CLASS 
 
Theories of democratization contend that democracy emerges both as a universal value 
and the most preferred system of government, arguing that it is the only political model with 
global appeal (Inglehart and Welzel 2003, 2005; Welzel 2013; Fukuyama 1992). 
Notwithstanding recent claims of an “authoritarian resurgence,” support for democracy remains 
strong even in authoritarian countries (Klingemann 1999; Inglehart 2003), yet even the most 
cursory analysis shows that many people who state they support democracy and democratic 
regimes often remain attached to authoritarian practices (Carrion 2008, Chu et al. 2008b; Bratton, 
Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Dalton and Shin 2014; Hale 2011, 2012; Rose, Mishler and 
Munro 2011; Schedler and Sarsfield 2007; Shi 2008, 2014; Shin 2012, 2015, 2017; Sin and 
Wells 2005; Welzel and Alvarez 2014). Moreover, many avowed supporters of democracy claim 
the regimes under which they live are democratic when they are not (Achen and Bartels 2016). 
Undeniably, many people have their own perceptions of democracy, or simply understand it 
differently (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007; Welzel 2013). These puzzling findings make re-
examining how democracy as a concept is understood necessary, because “democracy means 
little if there is no clear understanding of what it means” (Welzel 2013: 310).  
In this chapter, I examine the cognitive patterns among the middle class in the East 
(Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) and West (The United States, Australia, and New Zealand). I 
address the following questions: How do the middle class in East Asia identify the essential 
features of democracy? How do their conceptions of democracy differ from the middle class in 
consolidated democracies in the West? Theoretically, I argue that different trajectories in 
socioeconomic modernization altered the processes of cultural modernization and that this has 
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led to systematic differences in how people conceptualize democracy. Empirically, I subject 
these theoretical expectations to public-opinion data in the 6th wave of the WVS. I reveal 
consistent differences in how middle-class respondents in the East and West conceptualize 
democracy. Moreover, I find that middle-class respondents in East Asia with stronger feelings of 
state dependency are less likely to understand democracy in the liberal terms favored in the West.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I address 
different definitions and measures of democracy in relevant literature. The third section 
introduces a new framework for measuring democratic conceptions and provides descriptive 
statistics of each measurement. The fourth section describes differences in development in the 
regions and how that shaped various democratic conceptions among the middle class. The fifth 
section describes the data and methodology along with the typologies used in this study. The 
sixth section presents my results, including multiple regression analyses, which demonstrate how 
state-led development shapes middle-class orientations, and the final section presents the 
conclusions of the chapter.  
 
Measuring Conceptions of Democracy 
Public-opinion data have been used as an essential tool to examine how ordinary citizens 
understand democracy (Huang, Chu, and Chang 2013). Although democracy is broadly defined 
as government by the people, much of the literature has emphasized measuring democracy 
through its origins, installation, consolidation, and survival; this has recently expanded in scope 
to identifying and assessing its quality (Morlino et al. 2011).  
Democracy scholars now utilize numerous strategies to effectively and systematically 
unpack the “D-word” and determine various definitions that people associate with democracy. 
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One method is to identify whether people can differentiate democratic regime characteristics 
from authoritarian ones (Cho 2014). The conventional wisdom of public-opinion studies posits 
that understandings of a political concept depend on people’s cognitive capacity to distinguish 
between characteristics that help define and reject it (McClosky and Zaller 1984). Other methods 
include open- and close-ended survey questions, both of which gauge respondents’ democratic 
conceptions. Open-ended surveys ask respondents questions such as “What does democracy 
mean to you?” (Canache 2012; Dalton, Shin, and Jou 2007; Shi and Lu 2010), whereas close-
ended survey questions consider respondents’ choices of the most essential characteristics of 
democracy (Bratton and Mattes; Carnaghan 2011; Miller, Helsi and Reisinger 1997; Welzel 
2011).  
In addition, analytical frameworks have been applied. Lijphart (1999) switched the focus 
of inquiry by examining the qualities, rather than the quality, of democracy. Welzel (2011) 
continued along this trajectory by observing liberal democratic conceptualizations through a 
three-factor model, which used 10 items from the 5th wave of the WVS and divided the meaning 
of democracy into the following four subcomponents: liberal, social, populist, and authoritarian 
dimensions.  
A similar analytical framework for assessing democratic qualities was first applied to 
Asian-Pacific countries in the early 2000s (Morlino et al. 2011). Morlino (2011) distinguished 
three dimensions—procedural, content, and outcome—all of which had their own subdimensions. 
This assessment methodology was applied to Taiwan’s young democracy to measure people’s 
perceived qualities of popular support for democracy (Chang, Chu, and Huang 2011). These 
were used to create a two-by-two typology of democratic orientations that differentiated between 
four types of democrats—consistent democrats, critical democrats, nondemocrats, and superficial 
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democrats—as well as to tap into people’s value orientations toward some core liberal 
democratic values, including political equality, accountability, liberalism, and pluralism using 
questions that avoid the “D-word” (Chu and Huang 2010). Eventually this was also used to 
measure popular understandings of democracy as well as explore the origins of democratic 
conceptions in 12 East-Asian societies through variations between substantive- and procedure-
based democracy (Lu 2013).  
 
A New Framework  
Many different methods exist to conceptualize and measure democracy.15 Although 
various classificatory schemes have been applied to certain areas worldwide, none have provided 
an East–West comparison. Furthermore, the taxonomies themselves have often been limited in 
their breadth and depth. 
I use an approach that compares the cognitive patterns among middle-class people in the 
East and West. This approach consists of four interrelated questions that capture people’s broad 
understandings of democracy. First, I investigate whether people in both regions can identify 
essential democratic features, and then I examine how broadly people understand democracy and 
which democratic properties they value the most and least. Third, I assess whether people 
conceptualize democracy more procedurally or substantially. Finally, I analyze whether people 
conceptualize democracy more liberally or illiberally. I attempt to answer each question by 
comparing middle-class respondents in democracies in the East to those in democracies in the 
West.  
Identifying Democracy 
                                               
15 See Fuchs (1999); Dalton, Shin, and Jou (2007); Welzel (2011, 2013); Pereira (2012); Huang (2014); Canache 
(2012); Baviskar and Malone (2004); Bratton et al. (2005); and Ferrin and Kriesie (2014) for various democracy 
measurements.  
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The first question asks how well middle-class people identify democratic properties. To 
analyze popular conceptions of democracy, I focus on the following questions: How do middle-
class people identify democratic properties? How do they understand their constituents? To 
identify their system recognition, I use four questions from Wave 6 of the WVS that focus on the 
importance of four regime properties with the following instruction:  
“Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of 
democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as 
a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means ‘not at all an essential 
characteristic of democracy’ and 10 means it definitely is ‘an essential characteristic of 
democracy.’” 
 
The properties include: (1) interpreting laws religiously; (2) military intervention in politics; (3) 
electing leaders in free elections; and (4) protecting civil liberties.16 
To assess how middle-class respondents identify the essential properties of democracy, I 
examine responses to this set of four survey questions related to democratic properties and 
deduct autocratic identification from democratic identification. That is, I create a −2 to +2 index 
to examine whether respondents can differentiate democratic properties from autocratic ones. 
The lower the score, the less likely respondents are to be able to differentiate between the two 
regime types, whereas the higher the score, the more likely they are to be able to do so.  
 
 
                                               
16 The questions ask respondents to answer on a 10-point scale, where scores of 1 and 10 mean not at all essential 
and essential characteristics of democracy, respectively. For this measure, scores above the midpoint of 5 indicate 
being essential, whereas those below refer to not at all essential. Religious interpretation of the law and military 
intervention in politics (V132 and V135) are not essential characteristics of a democratic institution and are often 
associated with authoritarian regimes. As such, these two questions are classified as nonessential characteristics. 
Moreover, free elections and civil rights (V133 and V136) are considered core tenets of a democracy and considered 
here as essential democratic traits. Any responses including “Don’t Know” or “No Answer” have been omitted. 
24 
 
Table 2.1 Democratic Identification by Region. 
  West East 
−2 0.31 0.72 
−1 2.41 1.39 
0 17.19 9.69 
1 26.59 25.06 
2 53.51 63.15 
 
Table 2.1 shows that among members of the middle class, similar proportions exist of 
those who can and cannot differentiate regime traits in the East and West. However, those in the 
East have proportionally more respondents who can differentiate all the properties based on 
regime type (63.2%), whereas the West has a little over half (53.5%). The major difference 
between the two groups is in the proportion of those who are unsure about the properties, with 
nearly 10% in the East and 17.2% in the West.  
Depth of Democratic Understanding 
To analyze how differently middle-class people understand democracy, determining the 
breadth and depth of their understanding is crucial. This not only looks at whether they can 
identify essential democratic properties but also how well they can identify them. This question 
observes whether respondents view democracy as a unidimensional or multidimensional 
phenomenon (Dahl 1971; Diamond 1999; Lijphart 1999). The unidimensional framework 
defines democracy narrowly or thinly in terms of a few characteristics of a chosen dimension, 
such as elections and a universal franchise. The multidimensional phenomenon defines 
democracy broadly in terms of several dimensions, including liberalism.17 The second question, 
as such, asks about the breadth and depth of democratic understanding. Do middle-class people 
                                               
17 These broad and narrow definitions of democracy are also called minimal and maximal or supplemental 
definitions as well as thin and thick definitions (Coppedge 1999). This has also been characterized as a method of 
tapping indirect definitions (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007). 
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define democracy unidimensionally or multidimensionally? What properties do they value most 
and least?  
Analyzing the breadth of their democratic conceptions considers the total number of 
democratic properties respondents identify as democratic, because this allows researchers to 
observe both the range and scope of their democratic conceptions as well as the complexity of 
those conceptions (Canache 2012). Furthermore, comparing the means of those properties helps 
identify what respondents consider the most and least important of the properties surveyed. The 
more properties they identify, the broader and more complex their democratic understandings.  
To measure how broadly or narrowly middle-class people understand democracy, I use 
nine questions on regime properties from the same wave of the WVS. These questions ask 
whether people agree or disagree with statements regarding certain principles or institutions that 
are believed to be essential to democracy, asking respondents to rate the importance of nine 
regime properties on a 10-point scale following the same instructions as the previous section.18  
Table 2.2 Democratic Breadth and Depth by Country. 
  West East 
Electing leaders in free elections 87.3 89.3 
Guaranteeing gender equality 86.3 83.2 
Protecting civil liberties 74.7 82.4 
Government taxing the rich and subsidizing the poor 47.3 73.8 
Receiving state aid 51.4 76.8 
Promoting income equality 21.6 44.6 
Having citizens obey rulers 56.8 67.4 
Military interventions in politics 77.6 87.6 
Religious interpretation of the law 90.5 89.4 
 
                                               
18 The questions include the four listed above as well as five others for a total of nine, which entail (1) electing 
leaders in free elections; (2) guaranteeing gender equality; (3) protecting civil liberties; (4) taxing the rich and 
subsidizing the poor; (5) receiving state aid; (6) promoting income equality (7) having citizens obey their rulers; (8) 
military intervention in politics; (9) interpreting laws religiously. If respondents score higher on any of these than 
the scale midpoint of 5, these scores are counted towards the total.  
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In both groups of countries, properties such as “electing leaders in free elections” and 
“gender equality” are viewed as the most essential characteristics of a democracy. However, 
social democratic characteristics such as “the government taxing the rich and giving to the poor,” 
along with “equal income,” are significantly higher in the East than in the West. Nondemocratic 
properties such as religious interpretations of the law and military intervention are viewed as the 
least essential properties of a democracy among both groups. 
Figure 2.1 presents the average of both middle-class groups using a combination of all 
nine questions. The lower the percentage, the more likely the group is to view democracy 
narrowly. The higher the percentage, the more likely the group is to have broader understandings 
of democracy. Both regions have broader understandings of democracy, yet those in the East 
have broader views than those in the West by nearly 12%. The breadth–depth scale shows that 
those in the East have broader understandings of democracy with 77%, whereas those in the 
West have slightly narrower understandings with 66%. 
Figure 2.1 Democratic Breadth and Depth by Region. 
 
Minimal Understandings of Democracy 
65.9%
77.2%
West East
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The third question expands upon the narrow—or unidimensional—definition of 
democracy. Two unidimensional definitions exist based on minimal definitions of democracy: 
procedural and substantive. Procedural definitions include political institutions and procedures 
such as elections, whereas substantive definitions include those based on outcomes such as 
equality, responsiveness, welfare, and economic growth (Welzel 2013). Of the two definitions, 
the procedural type is much more widely used in the literature than the substantive type. In fact, 
much empirical research on democracy is based on the “procedural minimum,” which often 
equates democracy to a set of institutional procedures, such as free and fair elections and 
guaranteed freedom of speech, assembly, and association (Collier and Levitsky 1997). In reality, 
however, both procedural and substantive definitions of democracy are core aspects of a 
democracy because procedures do not automatically generate the outcomes that are viewed as 
normatively desirable. 
Do middle-class people conceptualize democracy more procedurally or substantially? Do 
those in the East understand democracy more procedurally or substantially than those in the West? 
To compare the prevalence of procedural understandings over substantive ones, I construct two 
3-point indexes measuring levels of substantive and procedural conceptions separately. Next, I 
construct a 7-point index of procedural–substantive conceptions by deducting scores of the 
substantive index from the procedural index.19 This takes the average of the mean of the three 
substantive conceptions and deducts it from the average of the mean of the three procedural 
                                               
19  These questions have the same instructions as above and include (1) electing leaders in free elections, (2) 
protecting civil liberties, and (3) guaranteeing gender equality. For the substantive conceptions, a set of three items 
tapping policy outcomes is used to construct a 4-point index of substantive conceptions, which include (1) 
promoting income equality, (2) receiving state aid, and (3) taxing the rich and subsidizing the poor. 
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questions, allowing for clearer observations of those with more procedural understandings of 
democracy, those with more substantive ones, or those with an equal amount of both.20  
Table 2.3 presents the proportions of each middle-class group on this −3 to +3 index. 
Larger percentages from −3 to −1 indicate a more substantive understanding of democracy, 
whereas larger percentages from +1 to +3 indicate a greater procedural understanding. In general, 
those in the East have higher levels of substantive understandings of democracy compared with 
those in the West, whereas those in the West have much greater procedural understanding of 
democracy than do those in the East.  
Table 2.3 Substantive−Procedural Views of Democracy by Region. 
 West East 
−3 0.08 0.24 
−2 0.61 1.09 
−1 3.79 7.91 
0 22.46 40.12 
1 30.5 34.86 
2 24.26 12.74 
3 18.29 3.03 
 
Liberal or Illiberal Understandings of Democracy 
The last question expands upon the procedural definition of democracy and disaggregates 
democratic and undemocratic procedures as liberal and illiberal properties. Liberal traits include 
core democratic properties such as “electing leaders in free elections” and “protecting civil 
liberties.” Liberal conceptions of democracy also include the absolute rejection of illiberal traits, 
such as “military intervention in politics” and “religious interpretation of the law” (Welzel 2013). 
Of the two subcategories of the procedural measure, the liberal procedural definition is much 
                                               
20 Democracy should not be defined exclusively in terms of a procedural minimum. The term “electoralism” has 
highlighted its shortcomings (see Karl 2000). 
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more prominent than its illiberal counterpart, and the two must be differentiated to examine 
preferences for liberal democracy (Shin and Kim 2018). An individual’s understanding of 
democracy can be considered truly liberal if that individual emphasizes liberal democratic 
meanings while simultaneously rejecting its illiberal meaning (Welzel 2013; Carrion 2008; 
Zakaria 1997, 2007). This differentiation allows for an evaluation of the way in which people 
conceptualize democracy through analyzing whether or not authoritarian characteristics are 
mistaken for democratic ones, and vice versa (Shin and Kim 2018).21  
Do middle-class people understand democracy liberally or illiberally? Do those in the 
East understand democracy more illiberally than those in the West? To measure orientations 
toward liberal democracy, I count the illiberal notion against the liberal notion, and subsequently 
deduct the illiberal index from the liberal index to construct a 7-point overall index of 
liberal−illiberal conceptions. This takes the average of the mean of the three liberal conceptions 
and subtracts them from the average of the mean of the three illiberal items; that is, each person’s 
average support of the three questions is calculated based on illiberal meanings of democracy, 
which is deducted from the average support of the three questions based on liberal meanings. 
The resulting difference is standardized into an index ranging from −3 to +3. The minimum of 
−3 indicates complete dominance of the illiberal notion of democracy over the liberal one, 
whereas the maximum of +3 indicates the exact opposite. A score of 0 indicates that the two 
notions are even. In other words, negative scores indicate that a respondent has a more illiberal 
understanding of democracy, whereas positive scores indicate a more liberal understanding.  
                                               
21 The same method used previously is adopted to measure the liberal definition of democracy, using a set of three 
items tapping democratic procedures and constructing a 4-point index of liberal conceptions. These questions 
include (1) electing leaders in free elections; (2) protecting civil liberties; and (3) guaranteeing gender equality. A 
set of three items tapping illiberal definitions is also used to construct a 4-point index of illiberal conceptions, 
including: (1) interpreting laws religiously, (2) military intervention in politics, and (3) having citizens obey their 
rulers.  
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Table 2.4 presents the differences in liberal–illiberal understandings by each group. In 
general, the descriptive statistics for this index do not show significant differences between those 
in the East and West, with both regions showing relatively more liberal orientations at 
approximately 80%. However, proportionally more middle-class respondents in the West have 
full liberal understandings of democracy compared with those in the East.  
Table 2.4 Illiberal–Liberal Views of Democracy by Region. 
 West East 
−3 5.63 2.45 
−2 3.62 4.66 
−1 10.45 14.31 
0 39.59 44.95 
1 27.72 26.08 
2 9.41 5.64 
3 3.59 1.91 
 
This four-dimensional framework for democratic conceptualization reveals that the 
middle classes in the East have significantly different understandings of democracy to those in 
the West. In particular, middle-class East Asians seem to have broader and more substantive-
based conceptions of democracy than do those in the West. As mentioned in the Introduction, 
these differences may stem from differences in economic development, and specifically the 
critical role of the state in rapid growth.  
 
Differences in Development  
Although the abovementioned framework reveals clear differences in the conception of 
democracy among the middle class in the East and West, this effect might be enhanced because 
of a history of state-led economic development, which limited growth in political–cultural 
development in East Asia. In the East, the state played a crucial role in developing business 
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structures and pushing for the growth of the middle class. Thus, the middle class there has a 
strong incentive to support strong states with active, interventionist policies and develop feelings 
of dependency toward the state, and furthermore they are more likely to reject the Western 
liberal notion of democracy, which often supports laissez-faire leadership.22 As such, people with 
higher levels of government dependency, particularly those in the middle class with a mutually 
supportive relationship with the government, can be expected to be less likely to conceptualize 
democracy in its liberal Western form. Accordingly, this chapter proposes the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: People in East-Asian democracies are less likely to identify traditional democratic 
properties and less likely to conceptualize democracy procedurally and liberally because 
of high levels of government affinity.  
 
H2: Middle-class people in East-Asian democracies who support having a strong state are 
less likely to identify traditional democratic properties and less likely to conceptualize 
democracy procedurally and liberally than those with less feelings of state dependency. 
 
Data and Methodology  
Using the 6th wave of the WVS, I examine cross-national and cross-regional variation by 
first comparing democracies in the East to those in the West, followed by comparing differences 
across middle-class groups between the two regions.23 To meaningfully compare the two regions, 
this study considers consolidated democracies in the East as well as those in the West. In the East, 
three consolidated democracies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) are included because they are 
the three modernized democratic Confucian countries in the region, part of what was called 
Confucian Asia (Shin 2012). The West includes consolidated democracies in what Welzel (2013) 
                                               
22 See Kurt Lewin (1939) for details on the three styles of leadership and decision-making tendencies. 
23 The 6th wave is from 2010 to 2014. 
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describes as the New West.24 This entails the oldest democracies, including the two liberal and 
consolidated democracies of Australia and New Zealand and the United States, which is the 
largest democracy in both physical size and population as well as the oldest continuous 
democracy and democratic constitution (Taylor et al. 2014).25  
Independent Variable: Feelings of Government Dependency  
I measure feelings of government dependency through a combination of two items: 
Government Responsibility and Government Ownership of Business. The Government 
Responsibility item asks respondents to choose whether the “Government should take more 
responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” or “People should take more responsibility 
for themselves” on a 10-point scale. This is reverse-coded, and thus dependence is on the high 
end. The Government Ownership item asks respondents to choose whether “Private ownership of 
business and industry should be increased” or “Government ownership of business and industry 
should be increased,” again on a 10-point scale. These two items are combined and standardized 
into a scale ranging from 0 (government independence) to 1 (government dependence), with 
decimal fractions indicating intermediate positions. Notably, variables related to state 
dependency include the specific government dependency questions that appeared most salient in 
                                               
24 See Welzel’s Freedom Rising (Chapter 8) for details on these groupings. There are more countries included in 
each grouping, but I incorporate all that are in Wave 6 of the WVS. There are five Western groups, but I only 
include the New West because they have strong consolidated democracies from the first wave. The other groups 
have contentious democracies (for example, the Old West includes Cyprus and the Return West includes Estonia, 
both of which are not often considered consolidated democracies). All of the countries in both groups have a Polity 
IV score of 10, with the exception of South Korea which scores an 8, showing that all of the countries included in 
this study are strong and consolidated democracies. 
25 See Taylor, Shugart, Lijphart, and Grofman (2014) for a list of 31 democracies and their wave of democratization. 
Four of the six countries used in this study are first-wave democracies. South Korea and Taiwan are the only 
second-wave democracies included in the categories. 
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the minds of citizens. Controls include government employment, gender, age, marriage, political 
interest, and financial satisfaction.26  
The middle class is measured through respondents’ reported income. On a scale of 1 to 
10, those who reported between 4 and 8 were coded as middle class.  
Dependent Variable: Conceptualizing Democracy 
The four dependent variables used to capture people’s conceptions of democracy stem 
from the four abovementioned interrelated questions. This includes the democratic identification 
of essential features of democracy, the breadth and depth of property identification, which 
properties are valued the most and least, whether democracy is conceptualized more procedurally 
or substantially, and whether people understand democracy more liberally or illiberally.  
 
Regression Analyses  
To explore the forces that shape accurate and divergent conceptions of democracy with 
respect to the most and least essential properties, as well as to explore how these forces differ 
across people in the East and West, I use multivariate regression analyses for each of the four 
questions by region. Table 2.5 below shows the effect of government dependency on democratic 
identification, the breadth and depth of democratic understandings, procedural-based 
conceptualizations, and liberal-based understandings. The results show that in both regions, 
higher levels of government affinity lead to an increase in identification and a decrease in 
breadth and procedural- and liberal-based conceptions of democracy. In the East, however, 
identification is statistically not significant while government affinity has a negative and 
statistically significant influence on the three other properties.  
                                               
26 The political interest variable is a combination of how much political interest people have and how important they 
view politics to be. Financial satisfaction is included as a control to ensure that support for a strong state is not based 
merely on respondents’ financial situations.  
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The full table (see Appendix A) presents all eight models for H1, including the control 
variables. Four models reveal government dependency among citizens in the West and the other 
four reveal dependency among those in the East. The results for all four measurements of 
democratic understandings are presented along with results for the control variables. As 
previously mentioned, government dependency leads to lower levels of broad conceptions of 
democracy; lower levels of procedural-based understandings (and higher levels of substantive-
based conceptions instead); and lower levels of liberal-based understandings (and higher levels 
of illiberal conceptions instead) of democracy among citizens in both regions. Moreover, among 
the controls, government employment and gender significantly influence some determinants 
among those in the West, yet have no significant effect in the East. Political interest, age, and 
financial satisfaction seem to affect certain models in both regions. 
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 Table 2.6 similarly illustrates the effect of government dependency on democratic 
identification, the breadth and depth of democratic understandings, procedural-based 
conceptualizations, and liberal-based understandings among the middle classes in both regions. 
The results indicate that in both regions, higher levels of government affinity lead to an increase 
in identification and a decrease in breadth and procedural and liberal conceptions of democracy; 
all are statistically significant with the exception of democratic identification among the middle 
class in the East. 
 In addition, among the four measurements, government dependency has the strongest 
negative effect on procedural-based understandings. This implies that those who are more 
supportive of the government are more likely to conceptualize democracy through its substantive 
properties, many of which include economic support from the state.  
The full table (see Appendix A) presents the regression models in depth, and again, there 
are eight models for H2; four models reveal government dependency among citizens in the West 
and the other four reveal dependency among those in the East. The results for all four 
measurements of democratic understandings are presented along with results for the control 
variables. As mentioned previously, government dependency leads to lower levels of broad 
conceptions of democracy; lower levels of procedural-based understandings (and higher levels of 
substantive-based conceptions instead); and lower levels of liberal-based understandings (and 
higher levels of illiberal conceptions instead) of democracy among citizens in both regions. 
Moreover, among the controls, government employment and political interest significantly 
influence all four models in the West, yet have little to no effect on any of the models in the East. 
Political interest, age, and financial satisfaction seem to affect certain models in both regions.  
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As H1 predicted, support for a strong state predicts lower levels of liberal and Western 
democratic understandings among people in East-Asian democracies. Furthermore, as H2 
predicted, this also seems to be the case for the middle class. More remarkable is that 
government dependency has similar—if not more—of an impact among the middle class in the 
West, which implies that government affinity could influence variations in democratic 
understandings in the West if more middle-class people feel dependent on the government. 
Because this is more often the case in the East, feelings of government dependency can be 
inferred to significantly influence breadth of understanding as well as lead middle-class 
respondents to have more substantive and illiberal understandings of democracy.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter tapped into broader questions about modernization and democratic attitudes, 
which were discussed through four domains of democratic knowledge. This study asked four 
questions, all of which were interrelated, regarding different manners in which democracy is 
conceptualized and understood. Starting with broad questions and ending with narrow ones, it 
showed that compared with the West, the East has higher proportions of middle-class people 
who are uninformed, find socialist democratic properties more essential than those in the West, 
have lower levels of procedural understanding and higher levels of substantive-based 
understanding, and lower proportions with liberal understandings of democracy. In addition, 
multiple regression analyses found that, as H1 predicted, support for a strong state predicted 
lower levels of liberal and Western democratic understandings among people in East-Asian 
democracies. Moreover, as H2 predicted, support for a strong state predicted lower levels of 
liberal and Western democratic understandings among the middle class in East-Asian 
38 
 
democracies. However, this was also the case for those in Western democracies. If middle-class 
groups in the West were as dependent on states as those in the East, similar results would be 
found.  
The questions, although disaggregated, were interrelated and worked in line with the 
broader question of how democracy is conceptualized. How do ordinary citizens understand and 
conceptualize democracy in East Asia? Do significant differences exist among those in the East 
and those in the West? How are their understandings different based on class? Theoretically, this 
study introduced the role of state intervention into the theories of modernization and 
differentiated state-dependent modernization in East Asia from that in the West. These two types 
of socioeconomic modernization affect the processes of cultural modernization differently. In the 
East, state-dependent modernization encourages people to support state intervention in their 
public and private lives, which creates a state-dependency orientation. These orientations 
discourage people from embracing emancipative values, which are essential for a liberal 
conception of democracy. In the West, however, state-independent modernization leads people to 
have state-independent orientations, which encourages them to uphold emancipative values. As a 
result, they favor the idea and practices of a liberal democracy. Because of these different 
processes, the theories of modernization unintentionally create different understandings of 
democracy in the East and West.  
Since the “The American Voter,” studies have consistently discussed democratic 
citizenship and how support for democracy varies. However, these discussions can only continue 
if the notion that some aspects of democracy are more salient than others is accepted, as well as 
that this differs in various cultural contexts and through various modernization processes. To 
understand the varying levels of democratic support that East-Asian citizens have shown in the 
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literature, it is crucial to first account for the different ways in which democracy is 
conceptualized and the varying components East Asians may associate with democracy. Only 
then will it be possible to properly analyze democratic support and properly define the ideal 
democratic citizen. 
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Appendix A: Full Statistical Models 
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CHAPTER 3:  
VARYING CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY IN EAST ASIA 
 
The various connotations that accompany the notion of democracy have led to numerous 
academic debates among democracy scholars worldwide. Although most conceptions of 
democracy relate to how democratic ideas and practices are established within a society, many 
empirical puzzles that stem from measuring democracy cannot be effectively addressed because 
of their various meanings (Lu 2013). The manner in which democracy is conceptualized is 
especially critical in newly emerging democracies, particularly those in East Asia, as they 
continue their attempt to consolidate when the region maintains a large degree of regime 
diversity (Pei 1998). Moreover, East Asia continues to experience rapid and constant changes, 
which has led these countries to become substantially different to those under Western 
democracy, particularly in their institutional arrangements, ideologies, and forms of leadership. 
Many countries in East Asia, including nondemocracies such as China and Vietnam and even 
democracies such as Japan and South Korea, continue to challenge the Western liberal 
conception of democracy (Morlino et al. 2011).  
Chapter 2 examined how middle-class East Asians understand democracy and how their 
conceptions of democracy compare with those in the West. I found that, relative to those in the 
West, middle-class East Asians are less likely to identify core democratic properties and less 
likely to conceptualize democracy in procedural and liberal terms. To provide more systematic 
empirical evidence from East Asia, this chapter examines how those living in similar cultural and 
social environments understand democracy and explore these differences among the middle class 
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in six East-Asian Confucian-based societies: Japan, South Korea (Korea hereafter), Taiwan, 
China, Singapore, and Vietnam.27  
How differently do middle-class East Asians understand democracy? Using a similar 
conceptual framework from the previous chapter and providing more detailed analyses, I 
examine how middle-class East Asians identify essential democratic properties and which 
properties are the most and least prevalent among them using the fourth wave of the ABS.28  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The following section describes the 
existing taxonomies of democracy and introduces the framework used in this chapter. The third 
section discusses the survey battery and how the questions based on popular understandings of 
democracy will be analyzed. Using this instrument, the fourth section demonstrates the cross-
country and cross-regime variance in the surveyed middle-class East Asians’ conceptions of 
democracy through multiple and multilevel regression analyses. Finally, the fifth section 
concludes the chapter and provides suggestions for future research.  
 
Conceptions of Democracy in East Asia 
Four components of democracy have been regularly and repeatedly emphasized by East-
Asia democracy scholars: (1) norms and procedures, (2) freedom and liberty, (3) social equity, 
and (4) good governance.29 The extant literature on democracy has further grouped these four 
components into two broader dimensions: procedure-based and substantive -based definitions. 
The dimensions of social equity and good governance taps into the substantive -based definition 
                                               
27 See Shin (2011) for details on Confucian Asia. 
28 The third wave of the ABS designed a new survey battery with a close-ended format to gauge democratic 
conceptions in East-Asian societies. This new instrument is also in the fourth wave of the ABS, and this chapter uses 
the same set of questions to facilitate dialog with existing research. 
29 See Canache (2012); Dalton, Shin, and Jou (2007); Lu (2013); Huang, Chu, and Chang (2013); and Shin (2012) 
for details on this framework.  
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of democracy, since it prioritizes the outputs of a political system, emphasizes the instrumental 
value of democracy, and focuses on improving government performance. The components of 
norms and procedures, along with freedom and liberty, fall into the procedure-based definition, 
since it emphasizes the decision-making process along with the intrinsic value of democracy.  
Much of the recent democracy literature in East Asia looks at distinct patterns of 
democratic conceptualization using survey data. Huang, Chu, and Chang (2013) and Lu (2013) 
used a battery of questions from the third wave of the ABS to categorize these four 
components.30 They combined the dimensions of social equity and good governance to indicate a 
substantive-based democratic conception while simultaneously merging the dimensions of norms 
and procedures, or freedom and liberty for procedure-based democratic understandings. They 
found that in general, East Asians do not prioritize procedure-based democratic conceptions.  
 
A New Framework for the Middle Class 
In this chapter, to facilitate further meaningful dialog within the existing research, I 
follow the aforementioned framework to examine popular understandings of democracy and 
gauge democratic conceptions among the middle class in East Asia. Moreover, I provide 
comparisons by individual countries and regime types. I ask and attempt to answer four broad 
questions through this framework: Are middle-class groups in East Asia capable of identifying 
essential properties of democracy? Do middle-class groups understand democracy broadly or 
narrowly? Which are the most and least prevalent democratic properties among the middle class, 
and do these vary significantly across individual countries and regimes? Do middle-class East 
Asians understand democracy more substantively than procedurally, as it is known in the 
                                               
30 According to the Asia Barometer Survey, this survey battery was made to effectively capture East Asian 
respondents’ varying conceptualizations of democracy. Moreover, it offers valuable information by minimizing 
subjective bias (Lu 2013) and easing the implementation and increasing the quality of collected data (Lu 2013).  
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literature? How prominently do they regard liberal values as an essential property? Is liberalism a 
prominent feature of democracy among East Asians?  
Survey Items 
To differentiate between the four dimensions of democracy and two categories of 
substantive- and procedure-based democracy, I adopt similar measurements to those used by 
Huang, Chu, and Chang (2013) and Lu (2013) and adopt the same battery of items from the third 
wave. However, instead of the third wave, I use four questions designed in the fourth wave of the 
ABS that ask respondents to identify the meaning of democracy. In this set, respondents are 
asked to choose the most essential characteristic of democracy from four groups of statements. 
Each group has four choices that tap into the four components, as well as link to the ideas of (1) 
norms and procedures, (2) freedom and liberty, (3) social equity, and (4) good governance. 
Respondents are asked to pick one statement for each question to represent what they consider to 
be the most essential characteristic of a democracy.31  
Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of 
democracy. If you have to choose only one from each four sets of statements that I am 
going to read, which one would you choose as the most essential characteristics of a 
democracy? 
 
Q88.  (1) Government narrows the gap between the rich and the poor. (Social equity) 
(2) People choose government leaders in a free and fair election. (Norms and procedures) 
(3) Government does not waste any public money. (Good governance) 
(4) People are free to express their political views openly. (Freedom and liberty) 
 
Q89. (1) The legislature has oversight over the government. (Norms and procedures) 
(2) Basic necessities, such as food, clothes, and shelter, are provided for all. (Social  
equity) 
(3) People are free to organize political groups. (Freedom and liberty) 
(4) Government provides people with quality public services. (Good governance) 
                                               
31 To minimize question order effect, the order of the components in the four groups are rotated. See Lu (2013) for 
details on the four components. 
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Q90.  (1) Government ensures law and order. (Good governance) 
(2) Media are free to criticize what the government does. (Freedom and liberty) 
(3) Government ensures job opportunities for all. (Social equity) 
(4) Multiple parties compete fairly in the election. (Norms and procedures) 
 
Q91.  (1) People have the freedom to take part in protests and demonstrations. (Freedom and 
liberty) 
(2) Politics is clean and free of corruption. (Good governance) 
(3) The court protects ordinary people from abuse of government power. (Norms and 
procedures) 
(4) People receive state aid if they are unemployed. (Social equity) 
 
In addition, the four components merge together into pairs to differentiate between 
procedure- and substantive -based democratic conceptions. That is, the four categories are 
recoded into binary variables that stand for procedure-based (norms and procedures or freedom 
and liberty) versus substantive -based (social equity or good governance) democratic conceptions. 
Substantive -based democracy includes social equity indicators such as a lower income 
inequality, more access to basic necessities, better job opportunities, and aid for unemployment. 
It also includes good governance indicators such as good management of public money, public 
services, maintenance of political order, and clean government. Procedure-based democracy, on 
the other hand, includes norms and procedures indicators such as free elections, party politics, 
and rule of law along with freedom and liberty indicators such as freedom of speech, association, 
and media.32  
This battery of items is grouped together in various manners and used to answer in-depth 
questions based on the broader questions, all of which are reiterated and described in detail in the 
following section.  
 
                                               
32 See Lu (2013) and Huang, Chu, and Chang (2013) for details on this framework.  
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Democratic Capabilities 
The first question examines how capable middle-class East Asians are of identifying 
essential properties of democracy. Capability refers to the extent to which respondents are able to 
choose one of four properties of social equity, norms and procedures, good governance, and 
freedom and liberty. To answer this question, I examine whether respondents chose one of the 
four properties each time the four properties were mentioned. This creates a 5-point index in 
which respondents’ choice options vary from a low of 0 to a high of 4. The lower the score, the 
less likely respondents were to be able to identify properties, whereas the higher the score, the 
more likely they were to be able to identify democratic properties.  
Overall, a significant proportion of middle-class East Asians are fully capable of 
identifying democratic properties, with a range from the lowest proportion of 32.7% (China) and 
the highest proportion of 56.8% (Korea). The largest proportions of those who were unable to 
identify democratic properties came from China (6.4%) and Singapore (4.5%).  
Table 3.1 Identifying Democratic Properties by Country. 
  Japan Korea Taiwan China Singapore Vietnam 
0 2.2 0.2 3.3 6.4 4.5 1.9 
1 1.9 0.3 6.6 3.4 1.5 1.4 
2 2.8 5.0 47.5 10.3 5.0 6.2 
3 55.3 37.7 42.6 47.3 51.3 48.9 
4 37.8 56.8 38.3 32.7 37.7 41.6 
 
The two subregions indicate that those in democracies have a greater proportion of fully 
capable respondents, registering a higher score of 47.6, whereas those in autocracies have a 
lower proportion of 36.3%. Conversely, those in democracies have a smaller proportion of those 
who are unable to identify properties (0.6%), whereas those in autocracies have a larger 
proportion at nearly 5%.  
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Table 3.2 Identifying Democratic Properties by Regime Type. 
  Democracies Nondemocracies 
0 0.6 4.7 
1 1.7 2.4 
2 5.0 8.0 
3 45.1 48.7 
4 47.6 36.3 
  
Breadth and Depth of Democratic Understanding 
Of the four democratic properties, which are the most popular or prevalent among the 
middle class in East Asia? Which is the least popular? Table 3 lists the breadth of prevalence 
among each property; that is, what proportion of respondents chose each property as an essential 
property at least once (on a scale of 0 to 1). As the mean scores show, the popularity of the 
categories varied significantly, from a low of 0.38 for the freedom measure in Vietnam and 
Japan to a high of 0.86 for good governance in Japan.  
Overall, the most prevalent property is good governance, followed by equity, norms, and 
freedom. Moreover, for all individual countries, the property of good governance registered the 
highest score. For all countries except Korea, freedom registered the lowest scores; in Korea, 
equity was the lowest.  
Table 3.3 Breadth and Depth by Country. 
  Japan Korea Taiwan China Singapore Vietnam 
Social Equity 0.63 0.53 0.62 0.65 0.72 0.75 
Norms & Procedures 0.50 0.70 0.68 0.67 0.55 0.57 
Good Governance 0.86 0.77 0.72 0.68 0.77 0.81 
Freedom 0.38 0.57 0.43 0.33 0.38 0.42 
 
Based on subregions, in both democratic and nondemocratic countries, good governance 
is the most prevalent property and freedom is the least prevalent, and furthermore, freedom is 
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significantly lower as a democratic property in nondemocracies. This implies that in general and 
contrary to Western democratic countries, freedom is not essential for democracy among the 
middle class in East Asia.  
 
Table 3.4 Breadth and Depth by Regime Type. 
 Democracies Nondemocracies 
Social Equity 0.59 0.69 
Norms & Procedures 0.65 0.61 
Good Governance 0.77 0.73 
Freedom 0.48 0.36 
 
Substantive Versus Procedural Democratic Understanding 
Do East Asians understand democracy more substantively than procedurally, as it is 
known in the literature? For this question, I combine the dimensions of social equity and good 
governance to indicate substantive-based definitions of democracy, as well as the dimensions of 
norms and procedures and freedom and liberty to indicate procedure-based definitions. The 
procedural index includes the number of times respondents chose freedom or norms as an 
essential property, whereas the substantive index includes the number of times respondents chose 
equity or governance as an essential property. The index of procedural conceptions takes the 
procedural index and deducts the substantive index. The values on this index range from a low of 
−2 to a high of +2. When democracy is conceived exclusively in procedural terms, it takes on the 
highest value of 2, whereas when it is conceived exclusively in substantive terms, it takes on the 
lowest value of −2. 
Overall, the majority of respondents have substantive-based understandings of democracy. 
In particular, Japan has the largest proportion of respondents with fully substantive conceptions 
of democracy at 23.8%, with Singapore and Vietnam following with 22.3% and 21.5%, 
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respectively. Korea has the smallest proportion with 9.7%, and instead has the largest proportion 
of those with a balanced (or mixed) understanding at 32.7%. Taiwan, on the other hand, has the 
largest proportion of respondents with fully procedural understandings at 10.7%, which is 
significantly higher than the other countries, which all have less than 5%.  
Table 3.5 Substantive–Procedural Views by Country. 
 Japan Korea Taiwan China Singapore Vietnam 
−2 23.8 9.7 15.2 14.3 22.3 21.5 
−1 30.9 23.5 31.1 29.2 31.5 33.1 
0 30.0 32.7 27.0 36.1 29.7 28.8 
1 13.1 29.3 16.1 15.8 13.7 14.4 
2 2.2 4.8 10.7 4.7 3.0 2.1 
 
Examining the substantive–procedural scale by regime type reveals similar proportions 
for both democracies and nondemocracies. The majority of respondents have substantive 
understandings of democracy, although those in democracies have slightly more respondents 
who have procedural-based conceptions.  
Table 3.6 Substantive–Procedural Views by Regime Type. 
 
Democracies Nondemocracies 
−2 14.79 18.03 
−1 27.81 30.76 
0 30.09 32.66 
1 21.05 14.96 
2 6.26 3.59 
 
The averages from each country also show similar results, with the middle class 
conceptualizing democracy through more substantive properties.33 Although middle-class 
respondents in all six countries prioritize substantive democratic properties, those in Korea, 
                                               
33 See Appendix B for table.  
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China, and Taiwan are relatively less likely to than those in Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam. 
Among all six, those in Vietnam prioritize substantive democratic properties the most, whereas 
those in Korea prioritize it the least. A comparison by subregion shows that autocracies have a 
much more substantive understanding of democracy, with a mean of −0.447, whereas 
democracies exhibit a mean of −0.238.  
Liberal Versus Illiberal Democratic Understanding 
How prominently do middle-class citizens regard liberal values as essential for 
democracy? Is liberalism prominent in understanding democracy among those in democracies or 
nondemocracies? For this question, I create a liberal index that deducts the equity index (scores 
of 0 and 1) from the freedom index (scores of 0 and 1). This creates a 3-point index from −1 to 
+1, with −1 referring to orientations toward a social democracy, 0 referring to orientations 
toward a mixed democracy, and 1 referring to orientations toward a liberal democracy.  
With the exception of Korea, the majority of middle-class respondents in all countries 
have a social democratic view of democracy, and less than a quarter in every country view 
democracy liberally.  
 Table 3.7 Illiberal–Liberal Views by Country. 
 Japan Korea Taiwan China Singapore Vietnam 
−1 43.1 28.0 44.2 46.8 47.8 48.2 
0 38.8 40.5 31.3 38.1 38.9 36.6 
1 18.1 31.5 24.5 15.1 13.4 15.1 
 
Although the middle class in democracies exhibit more liberal democratic understandings 
than do those in autocracies, the majority from both subregions still understand democracy 
illiberally.  
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Table 3.8 Illiberal–Liberal Views by Regime Type. 
 
Democracies Nondemocracies 
−1 37.06 47.42 
0 36.91 37.88 
1 26.03 14.7 
 
In addition, the mean values show that middle-class respondents from all countries view 
democracy more illiberally than liberally.34 Similarly, those in democracies and autocracies have 
more socialist-based understandings of democracy, although those in autocracies are slightly 
more likely to do so.  
 
Regression Results 
In addition, I demonstrate how feelings of government dependency may alter the 
aforementioned framework of democratic conceptualizations among the middle class in East 
Asia. As shown in the previous chapter, state-led economic development led to limited growth in 
political–cultural development among the middle classes, and instead led to greater feelings of 
government dependency. These feelings may continue to have significant effects on the limited 
democratic knowledge among middle-class citizens in East-Asian democracies, because state-led 
development played a critical role in economic growth. However, this feeling of dependency 
may have stronger effects among the middle class living in nondemocracies due to the 
continuing strong, or image of, the state and the lack of experience with a democratic system. 
Accordingly, I propose the following hypotheses. 
H1. Higher levels of government dependency will lead to lower levels of the cognitive 
dimension of democratic citizenship among middle-class people in East Asia. 
 
                                               
34 See Appendix for table. 
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H2. Higher levels of government dependency will lead to lower democratic identification 
and lower procedural and liberal views of democracy among middle-class people in East-
Asian nondemocracies more than in democracies. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 I consider conceptions of democracy by examining the middle class’ capability to 
identify democratic properties, their breadth and depth of understanding, whether their 
orientations toward democracy are procedural or substantive, and whether orientations are more 
liberal or illiberal in nature. The first two measurements can be measured simultaneously, and 
thus, there is a total of three dependent variables; the responses are coded on a 0 to 1 scale.  
Independent Variables 
 The independent variable includes an item that asks whether respondents want to live 
under their system of government more so than under any other system.35 The responses were 
coded on a 0 to 1 scale, with 0 being strongly disagree and 1 being strongly agree. The middle 
class is measured using respondents’ reported income. On a scale of 1 to 5, those who reported 
three and four were coded as middle class. Control variables include trust in government, 
political interest, education, gender, age, religiosity, employment, and marriage. All variables are 
recoded to a 0 to 1 scale.  
I first run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to determine whether this feeling of 
dependency has an effect on the four measurements of democratic conceptualizations. I examine 
this among the middle class in East Asia overall and by regime type, leading to nine separate 
models.  
Results 
                                               
35 ABS (Q86): I would rather live under our system of government than under any other that I can think of.  
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 The coefficient plots below present the results of multiple regression analyses of nine 
models in three different plots: East Asia overall, democracies, and nondemocracies.36 The first 
plot illustrates the effects of government dependency on democratic identification and breadth, 
procedural–substantive conceptions, and liberal–illiberal conceptions, after controlling for other 
variables. For all three conceptions, higher levels of government dependency predict lower and 
statistically significant levels of democratic conceptions. More specifically, higher levels of 
government dependency predict a decrease of 1.4 percentage points in democratic identification 
and democratic depth, a decrease of 3.1 percentage points in procedural-based understandings 
(and conversely more substantive-based understandings), and a decrease of 4.1 percentage points 
in liberal-based understandings (and conversely more illiberal-based understandings). More 
broadly, dependency predicts lower levels of identification and depth but lower procedural-based 
conceptions and even lower liberal-based conceptions of democracy.  
 The results are similar when I separate the middle-class respondents by regime type, 
examining the groups that live in democracies and nondemocracies; however, the results are 
statistically nonsignificant. This implies that although dependency may have an effect on East 
Asia as a whole, it has no significant effect based on those living under different regime types.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
36 The coefficient plots convert the effects of government dependency on democratic conceptualizations after 
controlling for other variables into a figure summarizing the fitted models’ parameters. 
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Figure 3.1 Coefficient Plots for Democratic Understanding. 
 
 The full table (see Appendix B) presents all nine models in depth.37 As mentioned 
previously, the results of the main predictor are only statistically significant for the region as a 
whole and not so for different regime types. Education has a positive and statistically significant 
effect for the region as well; those with higher levels of education were more likely to have 
Western liberal understandings of democracy. Similarly, employment is a positive and 
statistically significant predictor for Western, liberal democratic understanding for those in 
democracies, whereas political interest is a positive and statistically significant predictor for all 
three groups. As H1 surmised, higher levels of government dependency predict lower levels of 
the cognitive dimension of democratic citizenship among middle-class people in East Asia. 
Furthermore, as H2 predicted, higher levels of government dependency lead to lower democratic 
identification in all four measurements among those in East-Asian nondemocracies more than in 
democracies; however, the results are statistically nonsignificant.  
                                               
37 The full coefficient plot is also available. See Appendix F. 
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Multilevel models are also included for the first three models of all six countries (see 
Appendix B). The data is observed on two levels: individuals and countries. While the level-1 
predictors observe individual-level data, the level-2 predictor includes countries and polity scores. 
The models including the level-2 predictor, however, are not statistically significant.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined how conceptions of democracy among East Asians vary based on 
the countries in and regime types under which they live. To examine this in detail, I used various 
democratic measures as a central conceptual tool and defined it in both broad and specific terms. 
Overall, middle-class groups in East Asia seemed to differ in their democratic understandings 
through their abilities to identify different democratic properties along with a greater emphasis 
on substantive-based properties and lower emphasis on liberal-based properties of democracy.  
Although a significant majority of middle-class East Asians had the full capability to 
identify democratic properties, the freedom dimension registered the lowest score of breadth and 
depth; that is, freedom was considered the least essential property among the four main 
dimensions. Moreover, all of the middle-class respondents had significantly more substantive-
based understandings of democracy than procedure-based ones, although those in autocracies are 
more likely to prioritize substantive-based understandings than those in democracies. 
Furthermore, only a small minority of respondents had a liberal understanding of democracy in 
all countries, with a larger proportion in democracies than in autocracies. The regression results 
further showed that feelings of government dependency are likely to decrease democratic 
identification, procedural-based conceptions of democracy, and liberal-based conceptions of 
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democracy among the middle class in the region overall, although there were no significant 
effects based on regime type.  
The way in which democracy is conceptualized and understood can have significant 
implications to commitment to the democratic form of government for those living in both 
regime types in East Asia. In democracies, dissatisfied democrats may resort to civil 
disobedience or may become apathetic toward politics, both of which can seriously damage the 
quality of democracy. In nondemocracies, satisfied citizens can support authoritarian leaders and 
avoid any chances for regime transition. Indeed, the lens through which people evaluate 
democracy defines its success and whether they will support the democratic form of government. 
This continues in the next section.  
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Appendix B: Additional Statistical Models 
 
 
Substantive–Procedural Views Means by Country 
  Japan Korea Taiwan China Singapore Vietnam 
 Mean −0.61 −0.04 −0.24 −0.33 −0.56 −0.58 
 
 
 
Substantive–Procedural Views Means by Regime Type 
  Democracies Nondemocracies 
 Mean −0.238 −0.447 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
 
 
 
Illiberal–Liberal Views Means by Country 
  Japan Korea Taiwan China Singapore Vietnam 
  −0.25 −0.04 −0.198 −0.318 −0.344 −0.331 
 
 
 
Illiberal–Liberal Views Means by Regime Type 
  Democracies Nondemocracies 
  −0.110 −0.327 
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Full Coefficient Plot for Figure 3.1 
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Multilevel Model of the Middle Class in East Asia 
  East Asia 
  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Dependency 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) 
Age -0.016 -0.027 -0.045 
 (0.021) (0.030) (0.042) 
Employment 0.001 0.006 -0.006 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.020) 
Education 0.040+ 0.079* 0.131** 
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.044) 
Gender -0.007 -0.003 -0.024 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.017) 
Marriage -0.004 -0.013 0.013 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.024) 
Religion 0.016 0.033* 0.058** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.020) 
Political Interest 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.095**  
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.032) 
Polity 0.033 0.035 0.060 
 (0.034) (0.070) (0.082) 
Constant 0.758*** 0.335*** 0.279*** 
 (0.035) (0.062) (0.077) 
N 2083 2083 2083 
Log Likelihood 481.575 269.883 -960.193 
Akaike Inf. Crit. -939.169 563.765 1944.385 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. -871.528 631.406 2012.026 
  * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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PART 2: THE AFFECTIVE DIMENSION 
The previous section analyzed how middle-class citizens conceptualize democracy, as well as 
depicted the role of government dependency on the cognitive dimension of democratic 
citizenship (i.e., how middle-class citizens understand democracy). In addition, those chapters 
implied a strong bond between East-Asian middle-class citizens and their governments because 
of the history of their governments’ prominent role in economic growth in the region. In this 
section, I supplement the previous chapters by examining how middle-class citizens support 
democracy through the affective dimension of democratic citizenship.  
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CHAPTER 4:  
DECLINING DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT FROM THE MIDDLE CLASS 
 
Democracy scholars have long maintained that citizens worldwide have a strong 
normative commitment to the democratic form of government. This is particularly the case for 
established and consolidated democracies in North America and Western Europe, in which a 
mass basis of support is believed to remain widespread. However, recent studies have shown that 
public support for democracy in democracies in the Western world is falling, especially in the 
young and upper-income groups (Foa and Mounk 2016; 2017). This harrowing hypothesis may 
challenge the very existence of democracy since democracy is deemed consolidated only when 
citizens view it as “the only game in town” (Przeworski 1991).  
This chapter examines middle-class citizens’ attitudes toward democracy in consolidated 
democracies in East Asia and compares them with those in consolidated democracies in the 
West.38 I attempt to answer three central and closely related questions: Do middle-class citizens 
in East-Asian democracies support democracy? Do they prefer democracy to other regime types? 
What are the indicators of democratic decline in East Asia, and are they similar to those of the 
West?  
In this chapter, I argue that among middle-class people in East Asia, support for the 
democratic system is rapidly declining and that this is enhanced by lingering feelings of 
government dependency. I demonstrate this by first describing the erosion of democratic support 
among middle-class groups in the East and West. Subsequently, I offer an explanation for why 
democratic support is declining among middle-class citizens in East Asia, i.e., how government 
                                               
38 As in the previous section, the consolidated democracies from the West include the United States, Australia, and 
New Zealand, whereas those in the East include Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The Western countries are part of 
Welzel’s (2011) grouping on the “New West” in “Nations of Assessments of Democracy by Culture Zone” in 
Freedom Rising. All six countries score consistently highly on both the Polity IV index (above 8 out of 10) and the 
Freedom House index (above 82 out of 100). 
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dependency is increasing autocratic support. Next, I provide the data and methodology to support 
this theory and then conclude with the implications.  
Erosion of Democracy and Democratic Support 
Is democracy dying? Although the fear of democratic erosion has existed for decades, it 
has recently increased because of the growth of populism in the Western world and the 
consolidation of authoritarian rule in China and Russia. The election of Donald Trump in the 
United States, who has consistently praised dictators, encouraged violence, and threatened his 
rivals, along with the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, have led to deep concerns about 
democratic backsliding in the two oldest democracies (Mickey, Levitsky, and Way 2017). The 
growth of populist attitudes, seen through increasing support for France’s National Front, the rise 
of the Five Star Movement in Italy, and the growth of “illiberal democracy” in Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban’s Hungary have further increased fears about democracy’s future in Europe 
(Galston 2018).  
Furthermore, students of democracy have engaged in the debate on democratic 
backsliding. Many scholars continue to believe that the erosion of democracy is unlikely (Norris 
1999; Dalton 1999; Ekman and Linde 2005; Voeten 2017; Zilinsky 2019), with Norris (1999) 
characterizing the current malaise as the rise of the “critical citizen” that will eventually improve 
the quality of the democratic process. Democracy pessimists, however, are just as numerous 
(Diamond 2015; Levitsky and Way 2015; Bermeo 2016). Former democracy optimists Francis 
Fukuyama and Larry Diamond both have their doubts, with Fukuyama worrying that 
“democracy is being threatened in a way I have not experienced in my lifetime” and Diamond 
(2015) mentioning that the progression of democracy halted around 2006, and that this could 
“deepen and tip over into something much worse.” Fareed Zakaria (1997) famously warned of 
66 
 
the “rise of illiberal democracy,” and even more recently, Yascha Mounk (2018) stated that “the 
very survival of democracy is now in doubt.”  
Notwithstanding the robust discussion of these issues in the Western world, less attention 
has been given to the status of democracy in East Asia. Relatively speaking, support in East-
Asian democracies seems robust. Japan’s democracy has remained stable, with the public 
comfortable with the status quo and pleased with the current state of Japanese democracy. The 
public credits Japanese governance with producing a free, just, and safe society (Stokes and 
Devlin 2018). Citizens in South Korea recently worked what many believe to be a democratic 
miracle, organizing multiple large-scale, peaceful protests that led to the impeachment of then 
president Park Geun-hye and abolished her corrupt government in 2016 (Chang 2018). In 
Taiwan, the rise of social movements, grassroot organizations, and civil society groups has 
helped Taiwanese people construct a democratic society (Hsiao 1990). These groups have not 
only demanded changes from the government but also propelled liberalizing change (Wright 
1999), with one of the most recent examples coming from the Sunflower Movement in 2014. 
Moreover, the three East-Asian democracies seem as strongly consolidated, if not more so, than 
democracies in the West, and have recently been touted as great examples of democratic success. 
These three democracies have demonstrated much greater durability than those in 
Southeast Asia; democracy in the Philippines has been struggling with the dictator-like 
leadership of Rodrigo Duterte; Thailand has been torn between a meddling military and corrupt 
democracy; and Indonesia’s democracy seems perennially on the verge of collapse (Case 2017).  
Declining Democratic Support 
Although relevant studies have emphasized the strength of democracy and the significant 
amount of support democracy has received in East Asia, survey results indicate less 
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enthusiasm.39 The 6th wave (2010–2014) of the WVS revealed that 12.5% of respondents in the 
West responded that having a democratic political system is bad.40 Those in the East showed 
similar results (13.7%), implying that at least 1 in 10 people living in consolidated democracies 
in both regions are either dissatisfied with democracy or unlikely to support it.  
      Figure 4.1 Support for Nondemocratic System by Region. 
 
 
The results drawn from all socioeconomic strata seem to hold when researchers zero in 
on the middle class.41 Among middle-class respondents from democracies in both regions, 11.2% 
in the West and 13.3% in the East did not support a democratic political system.42 Middle-class 
East Asians are proportionally just as likely, if not more so, than those in the West to believe that 
democracy is not an effective system of government.  
 
                                               
39 See Chu et al. (2009) for a discussion on solidified support for democracy in East Asia.  
40 The responses include “Fairly bad” or “Very bad” for “having a democratic political system.” 
41 The middle class here is measured through a reported income scale. This is discussed in detail in the Data and 
Methods section.  
42 42 The responses include “Fairly bad” or “Very bad” for “having a democratic political system.” 
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         Figure 4.2 Nondemocratic Support by Region among Middle Class. 
 
This trend of declining support extends across age groups. As Foa and Mounk (2016) 
maintained, younger generations exhibited less commitment to democracy than do their older 
counterparts. From the oldest cohort to the youngest, the difference in democratic withdrawal 
among middle-class respondents was approximately 9.5% in the West and 5.5% in the East.43  
 Figure 4.3 Nondemocratic Support by Age and Region among Middle Class. 
 
                                               
43 Only one person was over 90 years in East Asia and was removed. There was a 4.5% difference between the two 
regions among the proportions of those who believe democracy to be bad among the youngest cohort, a 2.1% 
difference in the second youngest, and 3.7% and 3.4% differences among the following cohorts, respectively.   
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Because the concept of democracy carries a brand name, this question is often believed to 
lead to skewed results. People often support democracy superficially without supporting key 
democratic norms. Moreover, they will voice support for it as an institution even when they 
disagree with its practices. However, the results for this question alone indicate diminished 
enthusiasm for democracy as a form of government.  
Openness to Authoritarian Alternatives 
One could maintain that democracy is only truly at risk when there is a competing and 
appealing form of government (Foa and Mounk 2016). Questions in the WVS ask about military 
rule and dictatorial leadership, both of which have commonly been used to measure support for 
authoritarian governments.44 Overall, nearly 30% of middle-class respondents were likely to 
support authoritarianism in the West, whereas 48.2% were likely to do so in the East, showing 
that a large proportion of middle-class respondents in both regions support these nondemocratic 
alternatives.  
Furthermore, among middle-class respondents, 26.4% the West and over 50% (52.2%) in 
the East chose “Fairly good” or “Very good” for these items. In other words, one out of four 
people in the West and one out of two in the East are likely, to some degree, to support autocracy. 
Moreover, while democratic forms of government are losing support and authoritarianism is 
gaining support in both global regions, this is especially the case in the East.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
44 Support for authoritarianism includes two items: ‘Having a strong political leader who does not have to bother 
with parliaments and elections’ and ‘Having the army rule.’ 
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Figure 4.4 Autocratic Support by Region among Middle Class. 
 
Although younger generations of the middle class appear less committed to democracy, 
support for authoritarian alternatives is high among all age groups in both regions.45 When the 
age groups are compared, however, an approximately 5% difference exists between the oldest 
and youngest cohorts in the East. In the West, the youngest generation shows the most support 
for authoritarian traits (46.5%) and the older generations exhibit support of 29.4% on average. 
Although members of the youngest generation may be becoming much more open to 
authoritarianism in Western democracies, as Foa and Mounk maintained, support for 
authoritarianism seems spread fairly evenly among all age cohorts in the East.  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
45 There was only one person aged over 90 in East Asia and was removed.  
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 Figure 4.5 Autocratic Support by Age and Region among Middle Class. 
 
 
East–West Differences: The Remnants of Authoritarianism 
These observations raise the question of why democratic support is declining among 
middle-class groups in both regions, as well as why support is declining more rapidly in the East. 
As the previous chapters provided a strong link between feelings of government dependency and 
different conceptions of democracy, similarly here I speculate on the effects of government 
dependency on declining democratic support.  
In East-Asian democracies, state-led economic growth greatly enhanced the dependency 
of middle-class citizens on their governments. Not only did states play a critical role in the 
creation of the middle class but also helped sustain middle-class growth through the creation of 
white-collar jobs and providing steady benefits (Chen 2013; Chen and Lu 2011). The result was 
an intimate and mutually supportive relationship between middle-class citizens and their 
governments in East-Asian democracies, whereas middle-class citizens in Western democracies 
remained highly independent from their governments.  
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Furthermore, in East-Asian countries in general, those who feel dependent on the 
government are much less likely to embrace democracy as the “only game in town” because such 
citizens prefer strong governments that can be counted on to sustain their standard of living and 
help create and maintain stable jobs with good benefits. This contradicts the very core of 
democracy and works to buttress one of the main tenets of autocratic rule: having a strong central 
power. Indeed, because democracy is relatively new in East Asia and the region has historically 
revolved around authoritarianism,46 autocratic traits remain resilient in these countries (Hall and 
Ambrosio 2017).  
Contrasts between the two regime types can further amplify a democracy’s flaws, making 
it more difficult for middle-class citizens in particular to support democracy. The democratic 
system can be seen as a threat to middle-class people because it contains redistributive demands 
that work in favor of the working class and do not protect middle-class interests, leading to 
feelings of instability among middle-class citizens (Fukuyama 2012). Moreover, the recent 
transition to democracy has allowed a good proportion of the populace to experience both a 
strong authoritarian and new and somewhat fragile democratic institution. The sharp change 
during the regime shift provided a greater contrast between the two types of regimes. The greater 
the contrast between democratic and autocratic regimes, the easier it becomes to notice the 
current institution’s limitations and flaws, and the easier it is to become cynical about democracy 
as a political system. The less satisfied people become with their new democratic institutions, the 
more likely they are to look for alternative institutions, such as one with strong authoritarian 
elites (Svolik 2012). In this regard, the middle class may end up actively supporting authoritarian 
rule and rejecting democratic policies (Ozbudun 2005).  
                                               
46 Japan democratized during the second wave in 1945, whereas the democracies in South Korea and Taiwan came 
in the late 1980s during the third wave of democratization. The United States, Australia, and New Zealand, however, 
have been democratic for more than 100 years. See Huntington (1991) for descriptions of each wave. 
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For these reasons I surmise that the far smaller government-dependent middle class in the 
West does not as readily lead to a withdrawal of support for democracy; in the East, however, 
where the level of government dependency is much higher, the middle class is more likely to 
abandon support for democracy and favor authoritarian alternatives. This led me to propose the 
following hypotheses. 
H1. Government dependency does not influence democratic withdrawal among middle-
class citizens in Western democracies. 
 
H2. Government dependency increases democratic withdrawal among middle-class 
citizens in East-Asian democracies.  
 
Data and Methodology  
The basic data for this chapter come from the 6th wave of the WVS conducted during 
2010–2014. To measure the affective dimension of democratic citizenship, I conduct multiple 
regression analyses of the determinants of democratic support in both regions. The dependent 
variable is the withdrawal of democratic support during 2010–2014 and the main predictor 
variable is feelings of government dependency. I only include middle-class respondents, which 
are measured on a reported income scale. Measures of all variables including control variables 
are converted to a 0 to 1 scale.     
Dependent Variable: Withdrawal from Democracy 
To measure democratic support, I use a direct measure of negative attitudes toward the 
democratic system, which can be defined as withdrawal from democracy. I use the item that asks 
about having a democratic political system (V130) and whether the democratic political system 
is good for governing the country.47 The responses to this item are reverse-coded so that rejecting 
                                               
47 This item is used by Foa and Mounk (2016) and their critics, and they also consider the negative responses to this 
item.  
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the idea of having a democratic system is scored on the high end for measuring the degree of 
increase in negative responses to support for a democratic order. I standardize the scale into a 
range from 0 (strongly supporting democracy) to 1 (strongly rejecting democracy), with decimal 
fractions indicating intermediate positions. 
Independent Variables 
As in Chapter 2, I measure feelings of government through a combination of two survey 
questions from the WVS. The first question asks whether business ownership should be private 
or owned by the state (V97), and the second asks whether the government should take more 
responsibility than the people (V98; reverse-coded).48 I consider self-reported levels of income to 
measure the middle class, with those who reported between 5 and 8 on a scale of 1 to 10 coded 
as middle class. Control variables include sociodemographic variables (age, education, gender, 
and marriage) along with controls related to government dependency, including confidence in 
the government, government employment, interest in politics, importance of politics, and 
financial satisfaction.  
As in Chapter 2, the consolidated democracies in the West are the United States, 
Australia, and New Zealand, whereas those in the East are Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.49 
Methodology 
Because I am primarily interested in determining how much one can predict a middle 
class respondent’s support for democracy based on their feelings of government dependency 
along with control variables, I create two different models for middle-class respondents in the 
East and those in the West. I use regression analyses in addition to the descriptive statistics 
                                               
48 The first question (V97) asks whether business and industry should be private or whether government ownership 
should be increased, whereas the second question (V98) asks whether or not governments should take more 
responsibility than people. The second question was reverse-coded.  
49 See Freedom Rising by Welzel (2011) for more details on different groupings of Western countries. This set of 
Western countries is defined as the “New West.” 
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shown above to gauge the explanatory power of government dependency along with each set of 
controls on democratic withdrawal. The interpretation of the coefficient for the predictors is 
withdrawal for support; that is, higher coefficients imply less support for democracy.50  
 
Analysis 
All analyses are derived from OLS regression models. The results of a bivariate 
regression analyses of only the effect of government dependency on democratic withdrawal 
among middle-class respondents in the West and East on a 0 to 1 scale (See Appendix C). The 
results show that in both regions, higher levels of government dependency lead to higher levels 
of democratic withdrawal, with a 3.8% increase in the West and 12.1% increase in the East. 
However, only the result for East Asia is statistically significant (p < 0.001), implying that a 
significant effect only exists among middle-class citizens in the East, not in the West.  
Table 4.1 presents the results of a multiple regression analyses on the effect of 
government dependency on democratic withdrawal among middle-class respondents in the West 
and East on a 0 to 1 scale. That is, it shows the effects of government dependency including all 
of the abovementioned control variables (see the Appendix C for the full version). Similarly, the 
results show positive coefficients for both regions, with a 2% increase in the West and 10.5% 
increase in the East. Not only does the East show a significantly higher percentage but also a 
statistically significant on (p < 0.001), whereas the West does not. In other words, holding other 
variables constant, an increase in government dependency produces a 10.5% increase in 
democratic withdrawal among middle-class citizens in the East, whereas it has no significant 
effect in the West.  
                                               
50 A baseline model including only the respondents’ demographic profile and coding for all variables is listed in the 
Appendix.  
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Table 4.1 Government Dependency on Democratic Withdrawal by Region. 
Democratic Withdrawal M1 M2 
  West East 
Govt. Dependency 0.020 0.105*** 
 (0.024) (0.029) 
_cons 0.406*** 0.273*** 
  (0.038) (0.041) 
N 2,118 1,763 
 
To provide a clearer picture, the coefficient plot below presents the results of the multiple 
regression analyses in Table 4.1. Specifically, it converts the effects of government dependency 
on democratic withdrawal after controlling for the other variables into a figure that summarizes 
the fitted models’ parameters. 
Figure 4.6 Coefficient Plot for Democratic Withdrawal by Region.
 
As mentioned in Table 4.1, higher levels of government dependency in the West lead to 
approximately 2% higher levels of democratic withdrawal among middle-class respondents. 
However, this result has a small coefficient and is statistically nonsignificant. Among the 
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controls, however, age, education, confidence in the government, government employment, and 
interest in politics emerge as statistically significant predictors, with all variables exhibiting 
negative coefficients. Increases in confidence in the government, government employment, 
political interest, age, and education were all likely to lead to withdrawal of support for 
democracy in the West. Among them, political interest had the strongest effect.51 As H1 
predicted, government dependency has no statistically significant effect on democratic 
withdrawal among middle-class citizens in the West.  
By contrast in the East, government dependency emerges as a powerful predictor for 
declining democratic support. The predictor is positive, implying that government dependency 
increases democratic withdrawal; that is, an increase in government dependency leads to a 10.5% 
increase in democratic withdrawal and the coefficient is statistically significant at p < 0.000. 
Similar to in the West, age, confidence in the government, and interest in politics are negative 
and statistically significant predictors; furthermore, older respondents, those confident in their 
governments, and those interested in politics are more likely to withdraw support.52 As H2 
predicted, government dependency has a strong and positive effect on democratic withdrawal 
among middle-class citizens in East Asia.  
Summary of the Results  
The goal was to determine what affects nondemocratic support among middle-class 
people in East Asia. As in previous chapters, this section examined several indicators of 
democratic support. The main difference between the two regions in regard to democratic 
support between the East and West was in the feelings of government dependency. As H1 
predicted, government dependency had no statistically significant effect on increasing support 
                                               
51 The full regression table is provided in Appendix C. 
52 The full regression table is provided in Appendix C. 
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for nondemocratic institutions among middle-class citizens in the West. Moreover, the 
coefficient was low at only 2%. Moreover, as H2 predicted, government dependency had a 
significant effect on increasing support for nondemocratic institutions among middle-class 
citizens in the East. Although government dependency prevents middle-class citizens from 
embracing democracy in the East, it had no significant effect in the West.  
The results for control variables from both models were similar. Those that were 
confident in their democratic systems, interested in politics, and older were less likely to support 
nondemocratic regime types as well as to withdraw from democracy. As Foa and Mounk (2016) 
predicted, those who are younger were more likely to withdraw from democracy; however, I 
found this to be the case among middle-class respondents in both regions.  
Discussion and Conclusion  
Do middle-class citizens in East Asia support democracy? Do they support democracy 
more than their counterparts in the West? Through an examination of democratic support among 
middle-class groups in Eastern and Western democracies, I found that a high level of democratic 
withdrawal existed among middle-class groups in both regions. Furthermore, I found that 
democratic withdrawal was higher among those in the East than in the West. The results from the 
regression analyses suggested a critical difference between the two regions in their declining 
democratic support: government dependency among middle-class respondents had a strong effect 
on declining democratic support in East Asia but not in the West. Stated more broadly, the 
middle class in East Asia is likely to withdraw from democracy largely because of its close and 
dependent relationship with the state. 
I drew two inferences from these findings. First, given the causal relationship between 
government dependency and democratic withdrawal in East Asia, the middle class may become 
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more supportive of democracy if dependence on the government is significantly weakened. As 
the findings indicated, education, political interest, and financial satisfaction can eventually drive 
middle class support for democracy. However, this rests on the strengths of the government and 
whether it will continue to maintain this bond with the middle class.  
The second is that this positive correlation between government dependency and 
democratic withdrawal will challenge the unilinear approach, which argues that economic 
development inevitably leads to the emergence of a middle class that will push toward 
democratization. If the middle class continues to remain dependent on the government, even the 
wealthy and consolidated democracies in East Asia are prone to backsliding.53 As such, 
modernization theory (Lipset 1959) and the arguments that concern the strength of wealthy 
democracies (Przeworski et al. 2000) would be difficult to replicate in East-Asian democracies. 
These conclusions offer a bleak view for democracy, and recent sobering events signal 
that this trend of democratic withdrawal will continue, with democracy facing numerous 
challenges worldwide. The results from this chapter show that East Asia is no exception, and 
may in fact be even bleaker because the region also encompasses stable authoritarian and 
semidemocratic regimes. Indeed, “East Asian governments are a mix of democracy, liberalism, 
capitalism, oligarchy, and corruption—much like Western governments circa 1900” (Zakaria 
1997). As a result, examining the erosion of democratic support among nondemocratic countries 
in East Asia may elucidate whether the region as a whole will become more enthusiastic about 
democracy or whether it will continue to backslide. I discuss this in the following chapter.  
 
                                               
53 The most recent World Bank reports show that the GDP for the US, Australia, and New Zealand was 19.4 trillion 
USD, 1.32 trillion USD, and 205.9 billion USD respectively. In the East, Japan boasts a GDP of 4.87 trillion USD, 
Korea 1.53 trillion USD, and Taiwan 572.6 billion. Due to the rapid growth and economic success of the three East 
Asian democracies, moreover, they have been called variations of the Asian Tigers, the Flying Geese, and the Asian 
Miracle. 
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Appendix C 
Bivariate Regression Analyses of Government Dependency on Democratic 
Withdrawal. 
Democratic Withdrawal   
  West East 
Govt. Dependency 0.038 0.121*** 
 (0.023) (0.028) 
_cons 0.184*** 0.228*** 
  (0.010) (0.016) 
N 2,383 1,832 
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Full Table 4.1 
Democratic Withdrawal M1 M2 
  West East 
Govt. Dependency 0.020 0.105*** 
 (0.024) (0.029) 
Confidence in Govt. -0.125*** -0.047* 
 (0.023) (0.021) 
Govt. Employment -0.057*** 0.001 
 (0.013) (0.015) 
Political Interest -0.152*** -0.093*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) 
Importance of Politics -0.023 0.025 
 (0.027) (0.023) 
Financial Sat. -0.031 -0.073** 
 (0.024) (0.026) 
Age -0.096*** -0.103** 
 (0.027) (0.032) 
Education -0.035*** -0.015+ 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Gender 0.009 0.015 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Marriage -0.009 0.021 
 (0.015) (0.014) 
_cons 0.502*** 0.377*** 
  (0.030) (0.035) 
N 2,118 1,763 
R2 0.108 0.039 
Adj. R2 0.103 0.033 
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CHAPTER 5:  
THE EROSION OF DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT IN EAST ASIA 
 
 
Relevant literature shows that democracy has been recognized and supported by political 
leaders and citizens worldwide, as “virtually the only political model with global appeal, no 
matter what the culture” (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 70). It has been the most successful political 
idea in modern history (Eggel 2017), with the public supporting it because it is the best 
alternative (Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999). However, recent studies have shown that popular 
support for democracy among the public has been declining (Foa and Mounk 2016) or flat 
(Voeten 2016).  
In the previous chapter I examined democratic support among the middle class in 
consolidated democracies in the East and West. I found that democratic support is declining in 
both regions and that feelings of government dependency decrease support among the middle 
class in the East but not in the West. In this chapter, I examine the affective dimension in more 
detail by systematically comparing democratic support by regime type in East Asia. That is, I 
observe whether democratic support from the middle class varies in democracies (Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan) and nondemocracies (China, Singapore, and Vietnam).  
Do middle class East Asians support democracy or autocracy? Does support vary among 
those in democratic and nondemocratic regimes in East Asia? What are the indicators of 
declining democratic support among middle-class people in the region? I find that, in general, 
middle-class people living in democracies are more likely to genuinely support democracy than 
those in nondemocracies. Furthermore, I find that feelings of government dependency influence 
support in the region as a whole, but this does not vary by regime type.  
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The following section describes 
differences in support for democracy and autocracy among people living under different regime 
systems. The third section offers an explanation for why support may or may not vary among 
middle-class citizens under different regime types in East Asia. The fourth section describes the 
data and methodology, the fifth section provides results, and finally, the sixth section presents 
the conclusions.  
 
Teetering Democratic Support  
Support for democracy by regime type 
The years between 2006 and 2016 have been described as a “decade of decline” for 
liberal democracy (Eggel 2017). Many recent studies have shown that democratic support is 
declining worldwide, leading to democratic fragility in consolidated democracies (Foa and 
Mounk 2016; Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Nye et al. 1997). The reasons behind this argument 
are numerous. Those in democracies may be less inclined to support democracy because the gap 
between expectations and experience may be wide, particularly in societies that have only 
recently gone democratization. Moreover, citizens may hold unrealistic hopes for democracy and 
become quickly disappointed (Norris 1999). Others argue that established democratic institutions 
do not respond effectively or efficiently to popular demands (Inglehart 1990), whereas others 
contend that social groups are unable to moderate citizen demands, leading to an excess of 
democracy from the citizenry and ultimately toward a crisis of democracy (Crozier et al. 1975; 
Huntington 1981).  
By contrast, numerous findings have shown that overt support exists for democracy 
among those living in autocratic countries and that they view democracy as the best form of 
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government (Dalton and Ong 2005; Lu and Shi 2015; Shi 2008; Zhai 2018; Letsa and Wilfahrt 
2018). Those living in autocracies may desire a democracy for different reasons, but many see 
the benefits of a democratic system. For example, those with low socioeconomic status may 
prefer a democracy for its economic advantages, whereas those with high socioeconomic status 
may prefer it for political advantages (Letsa and Wilfahrt 2018). Those living in autocracies may 
instead believe that they live in democratic countries. Autocratic leaders, including dictators in 
Cuba and North Korea as well as China, Vietnam, and Singapore, praise democracy and claim 
their own regimes to be democratic (Chu and Huang 2010). This exertion of influence often 
encourages the public to believe the same.  
A similar political paradox can be observed in East-Asian countries. Studies have shown 
that citizens in one-party authoritarian governments express stronger support for democracy than 
citizens of liberal Asian democracies (Chu and Huang 2010; Kang 2004). In Vietnam, for 
example, large majorities (71.6%) have stated that democracy is the best form of government 
(Dalton and Ong 2005), whereas significantly lower levels of support were found in Korea and 
Taiwan (Chu and Huang 2010). Moreover, a large majority of respondents living in China 
believe their country to be democratic.  
These trends can be found among the middle class in East-Asian countries. According to 
the fourth wave of the ABS, a large proportion of the middle class in nondemocracies exhibit 
higher levels of democratic support.54 Three questions in the ABS ask about democracy in 
respondents’ countries as well as democratic support. The first item asks respondents how much 
                                               
54 The fourth wave of the ABS spans the years 2012–2014.  
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of a democracy their country is and the second asks how suitable democracy is for their country. 
The third item asks whether or not democracy is the best form of government.55  
• In your opinion, how much of a democracy is your country? 
• Do you think democracy is suitable for your country? 
• Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “Democracy may have its 
problems but it is the best form of government.” 
 
In all three, respondents in nondemocracies were more likely than those in democracies 
to believe their country to be more democratic, that democracy is more suitable for their country, 
and that democracy is the best form of government.  
 
Table 5.1 Democratic Support by Region Among the Middle Class. 
  Democracies Nondemocracies 
How Democratic 61.8 82.5 
Democracy Suitable 79.6 85.4 
Democracy Best Govt. 89.2 91.4 
 
Significant differences can also be observed in democratic support by age. Responses to 
an item in the 6th wave of the WVS indicated that the middle class in democracies are more 
likely to view the democratic system negatively than those in nondemocracies across the 
majority of age cohorts. Moreover, the decline in support in democracies is stronger among 
younger generations, whereas in nondemocracies, the decline in support is slightly weaker 
among younger people. In other words, those in democracies are proportionally more likely to 
reject democracy while those in nondemocracies are less likely to. Furthermore, although this 
democratic erosion is increasing among younger people in democracies, it is not increasing 
among them in nondemocracies.  
                                               
55 In the first and third item, four responses are collapsed into two. In the second item, 10 responses are collapsed 
into two.  
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Figure 5.1 Nondemocratic Support by Age and Region. 
 
These findings are puzzling. In East Asia, countries have historically democratized 
because of immense support from the people. Ordinary citizens have played a prominent role in 
the fight for political freedom and democratic institutions in democracies. Examples of this 
include the democracy movements in Korea and Taiwan during the 1980s, which eventually 
triggered democratization processes. The experience with strongman or military rule (or both) in 
Korea (e.g., Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan) and Taiwan (i.e., Chiang Kai-shek) 
encouraged people to fight for democracy.  
These findings also imply that democratic support can be simultaneously wide and 
shallow. Indeed, more than a decade of research using cross-national survey data has similarly 
shown that support for democracy often coexists with the acceptance of nondemocratic forms of 
government (Bratton 2002). This could be applied to East Asia as well, because most East 
Asians live in countries with a long history of autocratic rule and have different understandings 
of democracy due to remnants of authoritarian rule.  
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Support for authoritarianism by regime type 
Democratic support involves a detachment or rejection of authoritarian or nondemocratic 
alternatives. An aversion to authoritarianism has the same weight as support for democracy 
because democracy can only be supported if other forms are rejected (Chang, Chu, and Park 
2007). This suggests that support for liberal democracy can be conceived in terms of support 
for—or rejection of—autocratic rule. Moreover, the questions on authoritarian support 
intentionally omit the word “democracy” because the word carries a brand name. Questions with 
the word “democracy” could invite positive answers that seem socially desirable without actual 
support for the regime type (Chu and Huang 2010; Schedler and Sarsfield 2007; Chu, Welsh and 
Weatherall 2012; Chang, Chu, and Park 2007; Dalton and Shin 2014).  
Two questions from the ABS, as well as a combination of the two, explore whether 
respondents would favor a return to conceivable authoritarian alternatives: strongman rule and 
military rule.  
• We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things. 
• The army (military) should come in to govern the country. 
 
Table 5.2 shows that middle-class people in nondemocracies are more likely than those in 
democracies to support autocratic traits such as military dictatorships and authoritarian 
leadership. That is, although smaller proportions show support for authoritarian leadership and 
army rule in democracies, larger proportions show support in nondemocracies. 
           Table 5.2 Autocratic Support by Region Among the Middle Class. 
  Democracies Nondemocracies 
Strong Leader 16 24.3 
Army Rule 4.8 29.6 
Autocracy 17.3 37.4 
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Similar trends are also observed in various age cohorts. A combination of the same two 
items from the 6th wave of the WVS shows that middle-class support for authoritarianism is 
slightly higher in nondemocracies than in democracies. Furthermore, while support is 
proportionally larger for younger generations in nondemocracies, there seems to be 
proportionally less autocratic support among them in democracies.  
                     Figure 5.2 Autocratic Support by Age and Region. 
 
Other measures that consider autocratic support exhibit similar results. Dalton and Shin 
(2014) constructed an index of a scale of democratic preferences in which they deducted 
preferences for autocracy from preferences for democracy. By combining the two items on 
autocratic support and subtracting the average from support for democracy, support for 
democracy was still much higher among the middle class in democracies than in nondemocracies 
in East Asia.  
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Figure 5.3 Democratic–Autocratic Support by the Middle Class. 
 
 
Authoritarian Dependency  
Do middle-class East Asians support autocracy? Does autocratic support vary among 
those in democratic and nondemocratic regimes in East Asia? As described previously, state-led 
economic growth encouraged a mutually supportive relationship between the middle class and 
their governments. The state played a crucial role in developing middle classes by creating jobs 
and providing stability and benefits. This in turn encouraged the middle class to support a strong 
state and neutralized potential opposition. Therefore, in East Asia, authoritarian governments are 
often supported because of their seemingly strong state image and the manners in which they 
boost middle class economic self-interests through increasing public-sector employment and 
offering various perks for loyalty (Rosenfeld 2017).  
Moreover, decades of socialization to nondemocratic values in the region, including 
communism and Confucianism, have led the middle class to orient themselves toward the 
strengths of authoritarian governments. Confucian cultural traditions remain dominant and 
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significantly influential, and the values that come from this ideology are often inconsistent with 
democratic ones (Dalton and Ong 2005). The more people adhere to the collectivistic or 
hierarchical values of the predemocratic period, the more cautious they are about embracing 
democracy as their preferred form of government (Shin 2012).  
In democracies, those with higher levels of government dependency may be much more 
likely to embrace autocracy because citizens shift their support for regime change based on their 
assessments of how such changes serve their interests. If the democratic system is not promoting 
their priorities, citizens become less supportive of the process, and if they feel that it hinders 
them, they become more supportive of authoritarianism. By contrast, in nondemocracies, those 
with higher levels of government dependency may be less likely to support autocracy because 
the middle class continues to experience flaws that exist in authoritarian forms of government. 
Although the strong state is one they can rely on in theory, it may not be in practice. As such, we 
can surmise that higher levels of government dependency will increase autocratic support and 
those in democracies may be more supportive of authoritarianism, whereas those in 
nondemocracies may be less supportive. As such, the hypotheses for this chapter are as follows:  
 
H1. Those who feel dependent on the government among the middle classes in East Asia 
may be less likely to support democracy and more likely to support autocracy. 
 
H2. Those who feel dependent on the government among the middle classes in East-
Asian democracies may be more likely to support autocracy. 
 
H3. Those who feel dependent on the government among the middle classes in East-
Asian nondemocracies may be less likely to support autocracy. 
 
Data and Methods 
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The basic data for this chapter come from the 4th wave of the ABS (2012–2014) and 
includes three democracies (Japan, Korea, and Taiwan) and three nondemocracies (China, 
Singapore, and Vietnam). To measure the affective dimension of democratic citizenship in the 
context of East Asia, I include multiple regression analyses of the region as a whole, of 
democracies separately, and of nondemocracies separately. The dependent variable is measured 
through autocratic support (i.e., democratic withdrawal), and the main predictor variable is 
feelings of state dependency. As in previous chapters, the analyses focus only on middle-class 
respondents, which is measured using a reported income scale. Measures of all variables, 
including the controls, are converted to a 0 to 1 scale.   
Dependent Variable: Support for Authoritarianism 
Similar to the previous chapter, I use a measure of negative attitudes toward the 
democratic system, which here is defined as support for autocracy. I combine two items that tap 
into authoritarian sentiment to create a 3-point index. The first item asks whether we should get 
rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things. The second item asks 
whether the army (military) should come in to govern the country. The responses suggest that 
scores on the high end show more support for autocracy, whereas those on the lower end show 
less support for autocracy (and by default more support for democracy). I standardize the scale 
into a range from 0 (strongly rejecting authoritarianism) to 2 (strongly supporting 
authoritarianism).  
Independent Variables 
As in previous chapters, I measure feelings of state dependency through an item that asks 
whether respondents agree with the following statement: I would rather live under our system of 
government than under any other that I can think of (Q86). The responses are on a 4-point scale 
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that is standardized into a scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree), with 
decimal fractions indicating intermediate positions.  
The middle class is again measured through respondents’ reported income. On a scale of 
1 to 5, those who reported 3 and 4 were coded as middle class. Control variables include 
sociodemographic variables (age, gender, marriage, education, and religiosity) along with 
political interest and importance of government.  
Methodology 
Because I am primarily interested in determining how much one can predict a middle-
class respondent’s support for autocracy based on their feelings of government dependency along 
with control variables, I created three different models for middle-class respondents in East Asia: 
one examines support for autocracy in East Asia overall, one analyzes support for autocracy in 
democracies, and one observes support for autocracy in nondemocracies. I present regression 
analyses in addition to the abovementioned descriptive statistics to gauge the explanatory power 
of feelings of government dependency along with each set of controls on autocratic support. The 
interpretation of the coefficient for predictions is autocratic support; that is, higher coefficients 
imply less democratic support.  
 
Analyses 
All of the analyses use OLS regression models. The results of a bivariate regression 
analysis of only the effect of feeling government dependency on autocratic support among 
middle-class respondents in the region, democracies in the region, and nondemocracies in the 
region on a 0 to 1 scale (see Appendix D for table). The results show that in East Asia overall, 
feelings of government dependency increase autocratic support by 23.7% (p < 0.001). 
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Furthermore, dependency increases dependency in democracies by 7%, although this is 
nonsignificant, and by 23.3% in nondemocracies (p < 0.05). This implies that government 
dependency increases autocratic support and conversely decreases democratic support.  
Table 5.3 below presents the multiple regression results. The table shows that, controlling 
for other factors, increasing feelings of state dependency has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on middle-class groups in East Asia overall, but not in democracies and 
nondemocracies separately. 
Table 5.3 Government Dependency on Autocratic Support by Region. 
  M1 M2 M3 
  East Asia East Asian Democracies East Asian Nondemocracies 
Govt. Dependency 0.150** 0.083 -0.084 
 -0.058 -0.057 -0.197 
_cons 0.272** 0.422*** -0.089 
 -0.083 -0.086 -0.221 
N 1526 1204 322 
R2 0.026 0.02 0.078 
standard errors in parentheses 
  ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" 
 
The full table (see Appendix D) presents the results of the multiple regression analysis on 
the effect of feelings of dependency on autocratic support among middle-class respondents in 
East Asia overall and in both regime types on a 0 to 1 scale. That is, it shows the effects of 
feelings of dependency including all of the abovementioned control variables. Similarly, the 
results show positive coefficients in East Asia as a region and in democracies, with a 15% 
increase in the overall region and an 8.3% increase in democracies. However, the result is only 
statistically significant for the overall region (at p < 0.01). The result is negative in 
nondemocracies, implying that feelings of dependency decrease autocratic support, although it is 
statistically nonsignificant. In other words, increasing feelings of government dependency 
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produce a 15% increase in autocratic support in the region overall, whereas they have no 
significant effect when separated by regime type. Moreover, in democracies, higher education 
levels predict lower levels of autocratic support among the middle class. In nondemocracies, 
increasing government importance predicts higher levels of autocratic support among middle-
class citizens by 70%, whereas older middle-class people are less likely to support autocracy by 
33.8%.  
As H1 predicted, in general, higher levels of feeling dependent on the government among 
middle-class citizens in East Asia predict an increase in support for autocracy. As H2 predicted, 
those who feel dependent on the government among the middle class in East-Asian democracies 
may be more likely to support autocracy. As H3 predicted, those who feel dependent on the 
government among the middle class in East-Asian nondemocracies may be less likely to support 
autocracy. However, for both H2 and H3, the results are statistically nonsignificant. Although the 
main independent variable for H2 is positive (8.3%) and that for H3 is negative (8.4%), feelings 
of government dependency have no statistically significant effect on autocratic support among 
middle-class citizens by regime type.  
 
Conclusion 
Is democracy declining in East Asia? Did democracy ever fully establish itself in the 
region to begin with? An examination of support among the middle class in East Asia suggested 
that democracy is either eroding in the region or that it never fully consolidated in the first place. 
Moreover, the results suggested that the middle class will continue to support autocracy so long 
as their state continues to maintain its position in supporting them. This leads to a dire 
conclusion: democracies in East Asia may suffer considerably because of declining democratic 
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support, especially if the middle class continues to maintain close relationships with their 
governments. Indeed, democratic regimes cannot survive without support from their own people, 
and East Asia is lacking that support from the group that is supposed to be the strongest and most 
avid supporters. To truly ascertain whether democracy will endure or break down among East-
Asian democracies, whether democracy will be defended when it actually starts to erode must be 
examined. I discuss this in the following chapter.  
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Appendix D 
 
 
Bivariate Regression Analyses of Government Dependency on Autocratic Support. 
  East Asia East-Asian Democracies East-Asian Nondemocracies 
Govt. Dependency 0.237*** 0.070 0.233* 
 (0.052) (0.055) (0.114) 
_cons 0.168*** 0.184*** 0.266** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.080) 
N 2234 1289 945 
R2 0.009 0.001 0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  ="* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
 
Full Table 5.3 
  M1 M2 M3 
  East Asia East-Asian Democracies East-Asian Nondemocracies 
Govt. Dependency 0.150** 0.083 -0.084 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.197) 
Political Interest 0.009 -0.034 0.222 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.150) 
Importance of Govt 0.265*** 0.086 0.701*** 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.168) 
Age -0.123+ 0.008 -0.338* 
 (0.065) (0.069) (0.170) 
Gender -0.017 -0.028 0.088 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.080) 
Marriage -0.011 -0.037 0.023 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.051) 
Education -0.220* -0.130** 0.174 
 (0.090) (0.095) (0.214) 
Religiosity -0.012 -0.130** 0.164 
 (0.047) (0.049) (0.125) 
_cons 0.272** 0.422*** -0.089 
 (0.083) (0.086) (0.221) 
N 1526 1204 322 
R2 0.026 0.020 0.078 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  ="* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01  *** p < 0.001" 
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PART 3: THE BEHAVIORAL DIMENSION 
Thus far, I have focused on the cognitive and affective dimensions of democratic citizenship, 
both of which examine the attitudes of the middle class toward democracy. The cognitive 
dimension examined conceptions of democracy and how democracy is understood, whereas the 
affective dimension analyzed support, both of which emphasize attitudes toward democracy. 
This chapter illustrates the behavioral dimension of democratic citizenship and whether the 
middle class acts to defend democracy.  
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CHAPTER 6:  
THE MIDDLE CLASS AND PROTEST CULTURE IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
 
Are citizens willing to defend democracy? Furthermore, are middle-class citizens willing 
to defend democratic rule, despite its limitations? Will their political actions change if 
democratic institutions do not perform to their satisfaction? Although attitudes toward 
democracy are crucial to a democracy’s success, active participation is also a key component to a 
healthy and effective democracy (Almond and Verba 1963; Foa and Mounk 2016). Indeed, 
people participate in politics to drive the democratic process and influence the government, its 
leaders, and their actions (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Dalton and Welzel 2014).  
In this chapter, I examine the actions of middle-class citizens and how they influence the 
decisions made by political institutions through mass political behavior and participation. That is, 
I analyze the behavioral dimension of democratic citizenship by observing how much middle-
class citizens are willing to defend democracy through various forms of political participation in 
Korea. I selected Korea as a case study because the country has been heralded as one of the most 
dynamic and analytically interesting democracies from the third wave (Chu, Diamond, and Shin 
2001; Diamond, B. Kim, and P. Kim 2000; Diamond and Shin 2000; Diamond and Shin 2014). 
Not only has Korea been one of the most successful cases of rapid industrialization and 
democratic consolidation, but the country also developed a political culture that has empowered 
citizens through political activism and helped them master the art of protest (C. Kim 2017; S.C. 
Kim 2016; Premack 2016; Chang 2018; Koo 1999; 2002).  
In the next section, I explore how Korean citizens defend democracy through outpouring 
political activism and the intensity of protests before and after democratization. In the third 
section, I distinguish the differences between peaceful protests and other forms of political 
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activity in Korea and explain why this distinction is critical. The fourth section describes how 
feelings of government dependency can influence both categories of political activity, and I 
contend that it has an effect on peaceful demonstrations but not on other forms of political 
activity. The fifth section describes the data and results, and finally, the sixth section concludes 
and describes the implications for the future of Korean democracy.  
 
Political Activism and Defending Democracy in Korea 
The Beginning of Democratization Through to National Protests 
It has been over 30 years since Korea democratized and left behind its contentious 
authoritarian history. Since then, the country has been a shining example of rapid and successful 
democratization, with the peaceful transition from military dictatorship to a representative 
democracy; the quick creation of a multiparty system, free and fair elections, and the peaceful 
transfer of power between parties; and the smooth transformation of an entrenched system of 
developmental capitalism into a competitive market economy (Shin and Park 2008). Before 
democratization, however, Korea endured a long authoritarian period from 1948 to 1987. As one 
of the most authoritarian societies during that time, the First Republic lasted through the first 
presidency with Rhee Syngman’s civilian dictatorship from 1949 to 1960 and through the Third, 
Fourth, and Fifth Republics with Park Chung-hee’s military dictatorship from 1961 to 1979, 
Chun Doo-hwan’s coup d’état in 1979, and his subsequent rule until 1988.  
There were several nationwide uprisings to stop authoritarian rule during Chun Doo-
hwan’s coup d’état, two of which played critical roles in the events that led to democracy. The 
Gwangju Uprising began on May 18, 1980, when hundreds of thousands of citizens in the city of 
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Gwangju protested against martial law.56 Chun’s military forces unleashed tanks and helicopters 
on the city, ending the uprising in less than 2 hours and repressing the rebellion; however, the 
event became a pivotal moment in the struggle for democracy by sparking the June Democracy 
Movement in 1987.57 The June Movement sparked Chun to announce he would pass power to 
another military ruler without direct elections, triggering a public outcry that led to several 
prodemocracy demonstrations. One of these rallies, called the “Peace Parade,” brought out 
middle-class groups who had held back until then, helping the movement gain momentum.58 
With the help of the middle class, the “Peace Parade” officially ended Chun’s tyrannical rule on 
June 29, 1987, and the democratization process began in Korea. 
 
The Maturation of Democratization Through to the Candlelight Revolution 
The middle class and general public as a whole have continued to play a significant role 
in Korean political culture by actively participating in protests. This was clear when the protest 
culture reached new heights during the 2016–17 Candlelight Revolution.59 According to media 
reports, anywhere from hundreds of thousands to 2.32 million to 16 million Koreans came 
together to protest government corruption and abuses of power in Gwanghwamun Square over 
the course of 6 months (Chang 2018; Campbell 2018).60  
The Candlelight Revolution began with a demand to impeach the then President Park 
Geun-hye (박근혜) when news broke that President Park allowed long-time friend Choi Soon-sil 
                                               
56 This event is also called the May 18 Democratic Uprising, the Gwangju Massacre, and 5.18.  
57 This event is also referred to as the 6.10 Democracy Movement, the June Democratic Uprising, and the June 
Struggle.  
58 The Peace Parade began when a tear gas bomb hit Yonsei University student Yi Han-yeol (이한열) and he was 
fatally injured during one of the demonstrations on June 9. Over a million people protested to end dictatorship after 
this incident through the Peace Parade. 
59 This event is also called the 2016–17 South Korean Protests, the Park Geun-hye Resignment Nationwide 
Movement, and the Candlelight Struggle.  
60 The protests occurred every Saturday from October 2016 to April 2017.  
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(최순실) to meddle in private domestic and foreign policies and access confidential government 
documents and information (Harris 2017; Fendos 2017).61 President Park and her administration 
were also found to have blacklisted 10,000 political opponents, including filmmakers, writers, 
artists, and academics critical of the president and the government’s policies; those on the 
blacklist were denied state funding and were unable to pursue their careers. Through the news of 
these events, Park’s popularity declined substantially and her approval ratings had dropped to 
less than 5% by October 2016 (Lee 2018; Fermin-Robbins 2018).  
Indisputably, these practices of political corruption and influence-peddling enraged the 
masses. The protests eventually forced National Assembly legislators to impeach the president, 
which was unanimously ruled as being just by the Constitutional Court, leading to Park’s 
dramatic downfall from president to prisoner (Chang 2018). These protests led Park to become 
the first president to be impeached through democratic procedures in Korea, and the uprising 
came to be known to “serve as inspiration to defenders of liberal democracy around the world” 
(Mounk 2018: 185).  
 
An Emphasis on Peaceful Demonstrations 
What is most fascinating about these protests is that they were large, well-organized, and 
most critically, nonviolent. Tens of thousands of people took part in the Gwangju Uprising, over 
one million participated in the June Democracy Movement, and over sixteen million participated 
in the Candlelight Revolution. During each of these events, civil society groups worked quickly 
and successfully through high levels of internal cohesion and independence (S.C. Kim 2016:74); 
                                               
61 This has also been called “Choi Soon-sil gate” (Harris 2017; Fendos 2017). Choi, who had no credentials or 
authorization, coerced chaebols (conglomerates) into donating more than US$69 million to her foundation, 
demanded donations to fund her daughter’s equestrian activities, and pressured Ewha Women’s University to 
illegally admit her daughter. 
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furthermore, they were nonviolent. When soldiers threw tear gas grenades at the protestors 
during the Gwangju Uprising, the protestors threw back rolls of toilet paper (Adesnik and Kim 
2008), and the June Democracy Movement led the “Great National March of Peace” 
(국민평화대행진). Moreover, during the Candlelight Revolution, protestors held candles in 
front of the Blue House for twenty consecutive Saturdays. 
Such successfully organized peaceful demonstrations have become a cornerstone of 
political activity in Korea. They have become a part of the norm as democratic space expanded 
and provided a political space for Korean citizens to freely express their views (S.C. Kim 2017). 
Candles, moreover, have become an icon of peace, because they offer “a new platform that 
enabled protestors to convey their seriousness of intent through peaceful means” (S.C. Kim 
2017). Peaceful demonstrations are often festive and involve dancing and art, and they often 
have more in common with peace-ins and family festivals where performers sing protest songs 
and hold each other accountable for unruly behavior (Harris 2017; Ahrens 2016). In essence, 
Korea’s peaceful protests have taken on a life of their own. 
Because of the success of these protests and their nonviolent nature, a large proportion of 
Korean citizens (72%) continue to participate in peaceful demonstrations much more than they 
do in conventional political activities such as voting (58%).62 Furthermore, a large proportion of 
the middle class are much more likely to participate in peaceful demonstrations (75%) than vote 
(56%), which seems to also be increasing among the youth. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the proportion of middle class respondents who recently participated 
in peaceful demonstrations by age cohorts. Proportionally, younger people have participated 
                                               
62 The questions come from Wave 6 of the WVS. A gender gap seems to exist in peaceful demonstration 
participation in Korea. Proportionally, 64% of women have recently participated in peaceful demonstrations 
compared with 83% of men. 
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more in peaceful demonstrations than have older ones, although more than half of the 
respondents from older generations have also participated in peaceful demonstrations.  
Figure 6.1 Peaceful Demonstrations by Age. 
 
 
Measuring Political Activity: Distinction Between Two Categories  
Although peaceful demonstrations have become a notable part of Korean political culture, 
people do participate in other forms of political activity as well. Political activity largely 
encompasses “legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the 
selection of governmental personnel and the actions that they take” (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). 
The most conventional form includes voting and the nonconventional forms include signing 
petitions, joining boycotts, attending peaceful demonstrations, and joining strikes. Figure 6.2 
shows that a large proportion of middle-class people in Korea participate actively in all forms. In 
particular, larger majorities of the middle class participate in signing petitions and attending 
peaceful demonstrations.   
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Figure 6.2. Proportion of Political Activity among Middle Class. 
 
 
Political activity can be measured in various manners.63 Although various categories from 
the literature possess merit, they are limited in the case of Korea because peaceful 
demonstrations are ubiquitous and have taken on a life of their own. As such, peaceful 
demonstrations can be expected to have highly different effects compared with other forms of 
political activity. To create this distinction, I measure political activity in two ways by separating 
peaceful protests, measuring them separately, and combining other forms of political activity, 
which include signing petitions, joining strikes, joining boycotts, violent protests, group 
problem-solving, and other forms of protest.64 These two groups combined are most likely to 
encompass the fundamental dimensions of middle-class political participation.   
 
Impact of Government Dependency on Political Participation 
                                               
63 See Verba et al. (1978); Jennings (1997); Manion (1996); Shi (1997); and Chen (2000, 2004) for various 
definitions and measurements of political activity.  
64 To identify the major cluster or category of political participation, I ran an exploratory factor analysis on the four 
WVS items in the second category. Two major factors emerged from the factor analysis, each of which deals with a 
category of political participation.  
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As I discussed in previous chapters, the dependency that middle-class citizens feel toward 
their government may influence their attitudes toward democracy. This was seen through the 
cognitive and affective dimensions of democratic citizenship, because members of the middle 
class who felt dependent on the government often had broader understandings of democracy and 
were less likely to be supportive of it. Similarly, those who feel dependent on the government 
could be expected to be less likely to defend democracy through political action as well as to 
participate in political activities that could be considered as challenging the state, simply because 
they have less desire to challenge a government with which they have close ties.  
Because peaceful protests have become an iconic part of Korean political culture, 
however, this form of political action alone may have significantly different effects. Indeed, 
while those with higher levels of government dependency may in general be less likely to 
participate in political activity, they may be more likely to participate in peaceful protests than in 
other forms of political activity because these protests are often considered a cultural activity 
rather than a direct form of attacking the government. Furthermore, it may provide them with an 
opportunity to air their grievances without directly challenging the government. Accordingly, I 
separate peaceful protests from other forms of political activity and propose the following three 
hypotheses and test them in this chapter. 
H1. Government dependency has a negative effect on political activity among middle-
class citizens in Korea. 
 
H2. Government dependency has less of an effect on peaceful demonstrations than other 
forms of political activity among middle-class citizens in Korea.  
 
Empirical Analysis 
To explore these hypotheses, I run several analyses. The first examines the effects of 
government dependency on political activity excluding peaceful protests. The second analysis 
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tests the effects of government dependency on peaceful demonstrations. To explore H1 and H2, I 
use the the sixth wave (2010–2014) of the WVS and run OLS regressions.65  
 
Dependent Variables 
For the dependent variables, I separate the question on peaceful demonstrations from 
other forms of political activity, including signing petitions, joining strikes, joining boycotts, and 
other forms of protest.66  
Table 6.1 Categories of Political Activity. 
DV Group 1 Group 2 
WVS Wave 6: “Political 
action” 
 “Signing a petition” 
“Joining strikes” 
“Joining in boycotts”  
“Any other act of protest” 
“Attending peaceful 
demonstrations” 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 For the independent variable, I use the same items to measure feelings of government 
dependency that was used in Chapters 2 and 4. I combine two questions from the 6th wave of the 
WVS that ask whether the government should own more firms and whether it should be 
responsible for its people. The responses were coded on a 0 to 1 scale, with 0 being strongly 
disagree and 1 being strongly agree.  
Similar to previous chapters, the middle class is measured using respondents’ reported 
income. On a scale of 1 to 5, those who reported 3 and 4 were coded as middle class. Control 
variables include trust in government, political interest, importance of politics, financial 
                                               
65 Responses from the WVS (V85-V89) include responses of “Have done,” “Might do,” and “Would never do” for 
Political action: Signing a petition, Joining in boycotts, Attending peaceful demonstrations, Joining strikes, Any 
other act of protest. Items from the ABS did not include any specifically on peaceful demonstrations and thus could 
not be used for this section of the chapter.  
66 See the Appendix for the proportion of middle-class Koreans who have participated in each political activity.  
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satisfaction, and social status along with the commonly used variables education, gender, age, 
religiosity, employment, and marriage. All variables are recoded to a 0 to 1 scale.67  
 
Results 
 Figure 6.3 below presents the marginal effects of government dependency on both the 
dependent variables of political activity and peaceful protests controlling for all other variables 
(using a 0 to 1 scale). The graph indicates that increasing feelings of government dependency 
leads to a decline in various forms of political activity and an increase in peaceful protests.  
 
Figure 6.3 Marginal Effects of Dependency on Political Activity. 
 
 
                                               
67 Nearly 60% of the middle class has the highest level of education. See Appendix E for the full figure.  
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 Table 6.2 displays two OLS regressions separately from Figure 3 (see Appendix E for 
full table). The first presents the effects of government dependency on all forms of political 
activity (excluding peaceful demonstrations) while the second illustrates the effects of 
government dependency only on peaceful demonstrations. The results indicate that increasing 
feelings of government dependency predict a decrease in political activity and an increase in 
peaceful protests. The patterns suggest that, as H1 predicts, government dependency has a 
negative effect on political activity. As H2 predicts, moreover, dependency has less of an effect 
on peaceful demonstrations; however, both are not statistically significant.  
 
Table 6.2 Government Dependency and Political Activity 
  Model 1: Political Activity Model 2: Peaceful Protests 
Dependency -0.392 0.185 
 (0.834) (0.173) 
Constant 2.235 0.200 
 (1.816) (0.230) 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 
Conclusion 
 Korea is a democratic paradox. In one sense, the growth of peaceful demonstrations 
illuminates the maturation of Korea’s democracy and the democratic nature of its citizens. In 
another, however, the demonstrations against political corruption highlight the weakness of its 
party system as a mechanism for political mediation. Although Korean citizens have proven 
themselves to be icons of democracy, the country fails to have the highest democracy and 
freedom scores.68 In fact, Korea has the lowest democracy score among the nine countries 
observed in this study.  
                                               
68 Korea has a score of 8 on the Polity IV index and a score of 83 on the Freedom House Index. 
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 Will middle-class Koreans continue to defend democracy, in spite of the government’s 
limitations? The findings from this chapter suggest that it is possible due to the surging 
popularity of protest culture in Korea, but this is contingent on the continuing prominence of 
peaceful protests as well as the role of the state on middle class growth. Although middle-class 
Koreans may continue to participate in peaceful and successful protests, they may not defend 
democracy if the culture of peaceful protests dissipates. Moreover, they may not defend 
democracy if their dependency on the government increases over time. Indeed, middle-class 
Koreans may be less willing to challenge the government in the future even if it does not uphold 
its democratic ways.  
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Appendix E 
 
 
Full Table 6.2 
  Model 1: All Activity Model 2: Peaceful Protests 
Dependency -0.392 0.185 
 (0.834) (0.173) 
Age -2.253 -0.295+ 
 (0.947) (0.155) 
Education -0.709 -0.056 
 (0.915) (0.148) 
Class -2.179 -0.250 
 (1.206) (0.189) 
Gender -0.936 -0.014 
 (0.563) (0.063) 
Marriage 1.726 0.124 
 (0.610) (0.078) 
Financial Satisfaction 0.163 0.148 
 (0.649) (0.176) 
Political Interest -0.831 0.217 
 (0.914) (0.131) 
Importance of Politics -0.282 -0.054 
 (0.639) (0.128) 
Constant 2.235 0.200 
 (1.816) (0.230) 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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CHAPTER 7: FINAL THOUGHTS 
REASSESSING THE DEMOCRACY DEBATE 
 
Barrington Moore’s legendary aphorism “no bourgeois, no democracy” (1966) has 
remained prominent in comparative politics, with its notion that a strong and independent middle 
class constitutes a critical factor in a state’s likelihood for democratizing and sustaining its 
democracy. Many renowned scholars have supported this theory (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 
2005; Moore 1966; Lipset 1959; Dalton 1999; Easton 1975; Dahl 1992; Linz and Stepan 1996). 
The middle class acts as a critical element in the democratization process because it is crucial in 
the struggle for power, because “the shift in relative bargaining power from the ruling elites to 
the middle class allows the latter to prevail and sets democratization in motions” (Anderson 
2011). While the working class attempts to seize power for redistribution and the upper class 
attempts to keep it, because economic interests drive both classes, the middle class serves as the 
deciding factor—the “main thrust”—toward democratic development (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2005; Hattori, Funatsu, and Torii 2003).  
Are middle-class citizens committed to liberal democracy in East Asia? Do they prefer 
liberal democracy to other regime types, as middle-class citizens are believed to in the West? 
The research reported in this study sought to explore these and other related questions 
concerning modernization theory and cultural democratization from the perspective of the 
middle class. To this end, I began with a broad discussion of modernization theory and cultural 
democratization in East Asia. I discussed the manners in which modernization theory has been 
described in the literature and how it highlights the role of the middle class. I introduced the 
question of whether or not the middle classes have played a critical role in the democratization 
process in East Asia by examining whether they are committed to democratic politics. In 
studying their democratic orientations, I introduced the notion of democratic citizenship, which 
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emphasizes how people understand democracy (cognitive), whether or not they support it 
(affective), and whether they are willing to defend it (behavioral).  
Through this, I identified and analyzed the distinct patterns in which middle-class citizens 
understand, support, and defend democracy in East Asia. I examined the democratic orientations 
of the middle class in three consolidated democracies in the East (Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan) and compared them with those of three consolidated democracies in the West (the 
United States, Australia, and New Zealand). Subsequently, I compared democratic orientations 
of middle-class groups within East Asia by comparing democracies in the East (Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan) to those of three nondemocracies (China, Singapore, and Vietnam), making 
some comparisons by individual countries as well as providing a case study of South Korea.  
 In this final chapter, I first discuss the contributions of this study by highlighting the most 
notable findings reported in earlier chapters. I then evaluate the central claims and counterclaims 
surrounding modernization theory in view of these findings. I conclude by discussing some 
limitations and examining the implications of the findings on cultural democratization and the 
future of democracy in East Asia.  
 
Notable Findings  
 Are middle class East Asians committed to democratic politics? Do the middle class 
prefer democracy over other forms of government, and will they fight for it? To answer these 
questions in depth, I analyzed the middle class’ commitment to democracy in three steps. First, I 
examined middle-class groups in East-Asian democracies and compared them with democracies 
in the West. This included three consolidated democracies in each region to provide a systematic 
comparison: the United States, Australia, and New Zealand for the West, which Welzel (2011) 
114 
 
described as the “New West,” and Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in the East. Next, I compared 
middle-class groups in six countries in East Asia: the three democracies of Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and the three nondemocracies of China, Singapore, and Vietnam. These six countries 
make up Confucian Asia (Shin 2011) and allow for systematic comparisons by individual 
countries and regime types. Finally, I examined the democratic orientations of the middle class in 
these analyses through the notion of democratic citizenship. Using a combination of the sixth 
wave of the WVS and the fourth wave of the ABS, I analyzed differences in democratic 
orientations among the middle class through the cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions 
of democratic citizenship. These analyses suggested the following three points about the 
prevalence and influence of democracy among middle-class East Asians. 
The first point is that the middle class in East Asia conceptualize democracy very 
differently to those in the West, but not so among themselves. Compared with those in the West, 
middle-class respondents in the East were less likely to have in-depth understandings of 
democracy by more than 10%, and were more likely to view democracy substantively and 
illiberally. Indeed, Chapter 2 showed that over 18% of middle-class respondents in the West 
viewed democracy procedurally, whereas only 3% did so in the East. Moreover, within East Asia, 
I found little differences in democratic conceptualization. Although the middle class in 
democracies were more capable of identifying core democratic properties by nearly 10%, both 
subregions preferred good governance over freedom, substantive properties over procedural ones, 
and illiberal properties over liberal ones. As Chapter 3 described, 37% of those in democracies 
viewed democracy illiberally, whereas 47% did in nondemocracies.  
Equally notable is that the middle classes in East Asia are not quite attached to 
democracy as a system of government. While recent literature and my own results showed that 
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support for democracy is declining in the West, I found that it is declining even more rapidly in 
the East. Chapter 4 demonstrated severe democratic erosion in both regions, with 28% in the 
West and over 50% in the East supporting autocracy. Moreover, this democratic withdrawal and 
increasing autocratic support seem to be more prominent among the younger generations. 
Chapter 5 explicated variations in support within East Asia, and found that support for autocracy 
is stronger among middle-class groups in nondemocracies (37.4%) than in democracies (17.3%), 
as well as that authoritarian dependency was more prominent among younger cohorts in both 
subregions.  
Lastly, middle-class groups may defend democracy to some degree, but only when it 
suits them. In Chapter 6, I found that middle-class groups in South Korea will defend democracy 
by participating in demonstrations, most notably peaceful ones, but that this form of participation 
is deeply influenced by the protest culture that exists within the society. Moreover, it seems 
triggered by the Candlelight Revolution against political corruption rather than an effort to 
defend democracy.  
These three points suggest that the middle classes in East Asia have significantly lower 
levels of democratic citizenship than do those in the West. They also suggest that the middle 
classes in East Asia may have fundamentally different views of democracy. Through their 
different cognitive, affective, and behavioral patterns, it can be surmised that middle-class East 
Asians may be committed to democracy but not its liberal, Western form, and furthermore, this 
may be caused by the history of state-led economic growth in East Asia.   
 
Reassessing Modernization Theory and Government Dependency  
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Three sets of competing theories exist in literature on the determinants of democracy. The 
first set concerns the importance of socialization on cultural democratization, including 
democratic political learning theory, regime performance theory, socialization theory, and social 
capital theory.69 The second set concerns the role of political economy and inequality on 
democratization, including the redistributivist approach (Acemoglu and Robinson 2003, 2005; 
Boix 2003) and the elite-competition framework (Ansell and Samuels 2014). The third set 
concerns the orientations of middle-class groups and how class fragmentation, political 
instability, and social/material satisfaction influence democratic support, discussed through the 
unilinear and contingent approaches (Chen 2013).  
As one of the most prominent and robust findings in comparative politics, modernization 
theory encompasses various fragments of each of these competing theories and emphasizes one 
main factor in the consequences of socioeconomic modernization on cultural change: the role of 
the middle class.70 Indeed, the middle class must fully embrace liberal democracy to fully 
transform authoritarian regimes into fully functioning democratic ones.  
This study applied modernization theory in the context of East Asia and observed the 
cultural-democratic orientations of the middle class. Theoretically, this study showed that state-
led economic growth (state-dependent modernization) in East Asia allowed states to play a 
central role in the creation and development of middle-class groups, fostering a dependent and 
mutually supportive relationship. This altered the manner in which the middle class viewed the 
government, which then influenced how they view democracy. Empirically, findings of this 
study showed that higher levels of government dependency lead to lower levels of liberal 
democratic understanding (cognitive) among those living in East-Asian democracies, as well as 
                                               
69 See Shin (2012) for a full description of these determinants.  
70 There are many variants of modernization theory, one of which is neomodernization theory, which emphasizes the 
growth of emancipative values on cultural change (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013). 
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lower levels of liberal democratic support (affective) among those living in any of the six East-
Asian countries, and lower levels of political activity among the middle class in South Korea 
(behavioral), with the exception of peaceful protests.  
 The theoretical and empirical results have implications for the democracies in the West as 
well. They suggest that similar feelings of government dependency could have influenced 
Western middle classes to have less liberal views of democracy if their governments played a 
crucial part in economic growth. As Chapter 2 illustrated, middle-class respondents in the West 
were also inclined to view democracy less procedurally and more illiberally if they felt more 
dependent on their governments through a mutually supportive relationship. The main difference 
is that the West adopted state-independent modernization, whereas the East adopted state-
dependent modernization, and as such, state-led economic growth played a crucial role in middle 
class development in the East, whereas capitalist development had little to no role in middle class 
development in the West.  
 
Implications 
 Much work remains to be done in conceptualizing, measuring, and speculating about the 
relationship between state-led economic modernization, the middle class, and democratization. 
This study provided a limited account of this relationship by analyzing six countries in East Asia 
and comparing democracies in the East with those in the West. The range of countries in East 
Asia and the West that this study considered was limited, and providing additional analyses of 
other state-led economies in other regions such as Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia could also 
lead to noteworthy findings. Adding in other state-independent economies from the West could 
also lead to more generalizable implications. In addition, this work could be enhanced by 
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providing additional analyses of democratic citizenship and socioeconomic growth over time. 
Although this study analyzed democratic orientations using wave four of the ABS and wave six 
of the WVS, it could benefit greatly from analyses prior to these time frames to observe how 
commitment to liberal democratic politics has changed during the past few decades. Moreover, 
comparing countries with high levels of socioeconomic growth with those with lower levels, as 
well as comparing the middle class to other classes, could be helpful for observing whether 
economic growth influences the intensity of feelings of government dependency.  
Theoretical Implications for Modernization Theory 
This study attempted to take one step forward from limitations in the current literature on 
democracy and modernization theory. I applied modernization theory to East Asia and examined 
patterns among the middle class’ democratic orientations. I also introduced the notion of 
democratic citizenship to provide a multidimensional measurement of democratic commitment. I 
showed that, despite its global aspirations, modernization theory’s emphasis on the role of the 
middle class has remained relatively Euro-centric and suggested that feelings of government 
dependency are one explanation for why the middle classes in East Asia remain reluctant to push 
for liberal democracy.  
Political Implications for Democratization in East Asia 
 Will East Asia fully democratize? The findings from this study offer a bleak view for 
liberal democracy. Many people in East Asia face numerous problems of growing discontent and 
disillusionment with democracy, and institutions often compete against previously effective 
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian neighbors and past regimes. “If democracy does not shine in 
the eyes of the people of East Asia, its demonstration effect will be very limited and the 
prospects for further democratization in the region will be cast in doubt” (Chang, Chu, and 
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Huang 2011). While countries in the region continue to thrive economically, the middle class 
remains uncommitted and unenthusiastic to liberal democratic politics and show ambiguous 
orientations toward liberal democracy. As such, the results of this study imply that the classic 
causality between modernization and democratization may not be universally applicable to 
different cultural contexts.  
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